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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis will be analyzing the narratives of two mainstream
1
 American films, 
Black Swan (2010) and The Kids Are All Right (2010)
2
, critically highlighting the 
representations of non-normative female sexuality in each. I chose these two films for 
very specific reasons: because each film offers opportunities for queer interpretation and 
because they are both mainstream American films that were critically acclaimed. The 
narrative of each film offers a different representation of a ‗lesbian‘ and/or a ‗lesbian‘ 
relationship and in analyzing these representations, I will attempt to explore the cultural 
connotations of what a lesbian is and what constitutes a lesbian act; in doing so, I hope to 
combat the idea that a cinematic textual representation should represent all lesbians, or 
really, any lesbian, for that matter.  
 The questions I will explore in my analysis are: How does a film represent non-
normative female sexualities ‗positively‘ as opposed to ‗negatively‘? Who has the ability 
                                                          
1
 Here, I view “mainstream” as being available to a wide audience and widely known. I specifically chose 
to analyze mainstream films because I view popular cinema as a vastly important cultural artifact that 
greatly informs the way we view the world around us and how we come to view ourselves. It is a medium 
that teaches us what it means to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’, masculine or feminine, and heterosexual or 
homosexual; therefore, it is intricately connected to our understandings of gender, sexuality, history, and 
identity (Benshoff and Griffin, 2).  
2
 Black Swan and The Kids are All Right were nominated for Academy Awards in 2011; both were 
nominated for Best Motion Picture and Best Performance by an Actress in a Leading Role. Black Swan 
grossed $329,398,046 worldwide and was domestically released in 2,407 theatres grossing $106,954,678. 
It was nominated for five Academy Awards and Natalie Portman won the award for Best Performance by 
an Actress in a Leading Role. It is now available on DVD and Netflix, as well as has appeared on HBO. The 
Kids are All Right grossed $34,705,850 worldwide and was domestically released in 994 theatres grossing 
$20,811,365. It was nominated for four Academy Awards and is now available on DVD and Netflix and has 
appeared on HBO. http://www.boxofficemojo.com/ 
2 
 
to make decisions regarding whether a certain representation is ‗positive‘ or ‗negative‘? 
What are the political and intellectual stakes of categorizing representations in this way? 
With something so complex and nuanced as sexuality, is it possible to cinematically 
display what constitutes a ‗valid‘ lesbian desire? Does the refusal to identify as a 
‗lesbian‘ invalidate any and all same-sex experiences, making them insignificant? If one 
identifies as a lesbian and has sex with a man, does that mean that person is not a lesbian 
anymore? In what ways do these films offer opportunities for disidentification? How do 
these films exhibit queer failure and in what ways can this be useful for the spectator? I 
wish to use these questions as a guide in exploring the representations of non-normative 
sexuality in these two films and approach these films with an open and queer mind in 
order to investigate the possibilities of representations—and later, (dis)identifications—
without imposing on them a queer/straight binary. 
 In my analysis, I will actively resist labeling the representations as either 
‗positive‘ or ‗negative‘. Much feminist film theory and queer film theory has an inherent 
resistance to mainstream cinematic representations that are seen to reinforce homophobia. 
As Hanson states ―We are still in the throes of a lesbian and gay campaign for so-called 
positive images, representations of sexual minorities as normal, happy, intelligent, kind, 
sexually well adjusted, professionally adept, politically correct ladies and gentlemen…‖ 
(7). When discussing images of ‗lesbians‘ on screen, the debate often veers to whether 
these images ‗positively‘ reflect the complexities of a queer reality. Whose ‗reality‘ are 
these images purported to represent? Recuperating certain cinematic portrayals of 
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lesbians as ‗positive‘ images always does so at the expense of all other images and Other 
representations: 
 
More significant a problem, however, is the fact that images, even within a 
subcultural context, always compete within relations of domination where some 
will be considered positive over others for what are often covertly political 
reasons. Positive for whom is not merely a question of personal taste but a 
political question raised within a context where some people‘s sexuality is still 
more acceptable than others (Whatling, 84). 
 
Hanson goes on to say that ―the very notion of an image that is inherently 
homophobic or inherently positive strikes me as naïve since the political effects of an 
image are contingent upon the context of reception‖ (8). That is, the analysis of cinematic 
representations needs to keep in mind various considerations that get more nearly at the 
complexity and the difficulty of representations. As Richard Dyer suggests, ―This 
means…stressing that representations are presentations, always and necessarily entailing 
the use of the codes and conventions of the available cultural forms of presentation‖ (2). 
While representations rely wholly on presently available cultural forms to be intelligible, 
these cultural forms do not have a single, empirical meaning; people make sense of them 
in different ways and the meaning of an image is always mediated through a lens of lived 
experience.  
In pushing beyond simply labeling representations using a positive/negative 
dichotomy, we are then able to complexly question the concepts of correctness, identity, 
stereotyping, visibility, and authenticity (Hanson, 12). Representations are always in a 
tension with the reality to which they refer. Because they are re-presentations of 
representations of reality from an incomplete point of view, representations will never 
4 
 
wholly ‗get‘ reality; ―…reality is always more extensive and complicated than any 
system of representation can possibly comprehend…‖ (Dyer, 3). Foregrounding the 
complex and difficult nature of representations, rather than simply collapsing images into 
‗positive‘ or ‗negative‘ representations of reality, makes possible the critical analysis of 
representations as simultaneously productive and problematic. As Ellis Hansen states, 
―Once I realized that movies are not necessarily good because they reaffirm my politics 
or flatter my self-esteem, I found a long history of films that address the question of 
queerness in ways that challenge my mind, delight my eye, and complicate my 
understanding of sexuality‖ (11).  
 Both Black Swan and The Kids Are All Right contain representations of lesbian 
experiences—in one film, a woman has a ‗lesbian‘ fantasy and the other is about a self-
identified lesbian couple. I chose to analyze these two films in particular because each 
one portrays a lesbian or lesbian experience; but these are very different representations 
and in very different filmic contexts. While much work has been done on cinematic 
representations of lesbians in general (Kabir, 1995; Straayer, 1995; Weiss, 1993; 
Whatling, 1997; White, 1999; Wilton, 1995),  in regard to this project, work critiquing 
The Kids Are All Right and Black Swan in particular are somewhat lacking in critical 
engagement (Gibson and Wolske, 2011; Gupta, 2013; Walters, 2012).   
 While both of these films are American mainstream, they are very different in 
certain respects. I chose to juxtapose the analysis of these two particular films because 
one is categorized as a psychological thriller/horror (Black Swan) and the other is a 
drama/comedy. The Kids Are All Right was marketed as a film about a same-sex couple 
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and their journey to maintain their family dynamic once their children seek out their 
biological father. Black Swan, however, was marketed as a movie about a perfectionist 
ballerina and her descent into madness; the ‗lesbian‘ experience between the two main 
characters has very much been critically overlooked.
3
 Even in a review of the film done 
by Lesbian News Magazine, the only discussion of the sex scene between Nina (Natalie 
Portman) and Lily (Mila Kunis) was ―The steamiest sex scene between two women in a 
studio film this year is probably the one between…Natalie Portman and…Mila 
Kunis…We saw it and it was hot‖.
4
 Regardless of the scene‘s ‗hotness‘, there is much to 
be interrogated about the cinematic representation of female sexuality in general, and 
‗lesbian‘ sexuality more specifically.  
 Throughout this project, it may seem as though I am collapsing the use of 
‗lesbian‘ and ‗queer‘ when referring to spectators of these films as well as the characters 
in the films themselves. However, I am not setting up ‗queerness‘ as something 
inherently different and somehow ‗better‘ than ‗gay‘, ‗lesbian‘, or ‗bisexual‘; I base my 
notion of queerness on Alexander Doty‘s in that queerness ―…is a quality related to any 
expression that can be marked as contra-, non-, or anti-straight‖ (xv). I find this notion of 
queerness most productive because it resists the formulation of ‗queer‘ as an exclusive 
category that is ―seemingly more complex, progressive, or politically efficacious‖ than 
the identity categories of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (Doty, xvii).  
                                                          
3
 “One Nut Cracked Ballerina” By: Johnson, Brian D., Maclean's, 00249262, 12/6/2010, Vol. 123, Issue 
47.Database: Business Source Complete; “Natalie Portman, a deeply dark 'Black Swan': movie review” By: 
Rainer, Peter, Christian Science Monitor, 08827729, 12/3/2010.Database: Academic Search Complete; 
Lesbian News Magazine, Dec 2010 
4
 Lesbian News Magazine, John Esther, Dec 2010 
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 With these particular filmic texts, I found it most productive to use the term queer 
because each of these texts portrays a range of sexual identities as well as non-
heteronormative lifestyles. In this project, then, queer texts, textual elements, or 
responses to these texts are: 
 
…those discussed with reference to a range or a network of nonstraight ideas. 
The queerness in these cases might combine the lesbian, the gay, and the 
bisexual, or it might be a textual queerness not accurately described even by a 
combination of these labels…queer is used to describe the nonstraight work, 
positions, pleasures, and readings of people who either don‘t share the same 
sexual orientation as that articulated in the texts they are producing or responding 
to or who don‘t define themselves as lesbian, gay, bisexual (or straight, for that 
matter) (Doty, xviii). 
 
 
 The use of ‗non-straight‘ here is not necessarily synonymous with ‗non-
heterosexual‘, either. Straightness, according to Chris Straayer, is ―…an elitist discourse 
played out not only in the mass media but in our legal, medical, and other ―cultural‖ 
institutions‖ (180). Straightness not only means ‗heterosexual‘, but also implies white, 
economically privileged, young, healthy, and beautiful (Straayer, 180). If straightness is 
always normality, then queerness is always the failure to conform, to belong, and cohere; 
queerness is the failure to line up with what is normal. In this project, queerness does not 
solely mean non-normative sexualities or gender identifications, although of course that 
is certainly a part of it. My conception of queerness is that it represents ―…the open mesh 
of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances…‖ (Sedgwick, 8). Queerness 
then, names other possibilities, other outcomes besides ―normal.‖ It is non-linearity, 
futility, limitation, ineffectiveness, and unproductiveness; ultimately, queerness is 
activated though negativity rather than positivity (Halberstam, 110).  Therefore, like 
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Halberstam, I choose to establish queerness ―as a mode of critique rather than as a new 
investment in normativity or life or respectability or wholeness or legitimacy‖ (110-11). 
The negativity and failure of queerness offers us an escape from the rigid norms that 
discipline behavior and ultimately allows us to poke holes in ―the toxic positivity of 
contemporary life‖ (Halberstam, 3).  
 My first inclination when it came to analyzing Black Swan was to push against the 
use of psychoanalytic theory to guide me in my investigation; yet, anyone who has seen 
the film itself knows that it is crafted by and through psychoanalytic tropes. While I will 
be using psychoanalysis as a partial framework, it is by no means my only guiding 
principle. In fact, while it is useful to use psychoanalysis to interrogate a psychoanalytic-
laden horror film, I believe it would be highly unproductive to rely solely on its tenets. 
Because Black Swan is ―at all levels of its construction informed by psychoanalytic 
presuppositions, which both motivate and justify the narrative‖ (Grant, 181) 
psychoanalysis, then, becomes inseparable from the very text it is being used to analyze. 
Using solely psychoanalytic concepts would only allow for the elaboration of ―variant 
descriptions of the generic elements present in the film by virtue of its being the film it is, 
but in no sense [would it] reveal for the film an unconscious significance that, without 
[my] analysis would have remained hidden‖ (Grant, 182). Meaning, by relying only on 
psychoanalysis, I would only ‗uncover‘ what was already there. Therefore, through my 
analysis I would only make visible what was visible to begin with.  
I am not seeking to wholly devalue psychoanalytic theory as a tool for analysis; I 
will, however, attempt to use psychoanalysis in combination with other theoretical 
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frameworks in order to push beyond previous understandings. Namely, I will be drawing 
from Jose Munoz‘s reworking of psychoanalytic thought with his notion of 
‗disidentification‘
5
 and Chris Straayer‘s queer viewpoint of feminist film theory. 
Throughout this work, I will be invoking psychoanalytic terms when referring to 
spectators of these films as well as the films themselves; but, hopefully I will make it 
apparent that I am pushing these terms beyond their previous denotations.  
In using these two notions as the basis for my theoretical framework, I will be 
able to complexly engage and analyze not only the filmic representations themselves; but, 
more importantly, the stakes these representations hold for spectators, and how and in 
what ways spectators are able to use these images for their benefit. I am aiming to 
investigate subjectivity through the way certain narrative and filmic constructions 
position viewers and thus encourage particular readings—that is, how cinematic 
representations in Black Swan and The Kid Are All Right are available for queer and 
heterosexual appropriations alike. In my analysis of these films, I am not aiming to 
definitively ‗claim‘ these filmic representations as ‗positive‘ for ‗lesbian‘ viewers and I 
am not arguing that these films are wholly subversive. Each of the representations in 
these films are fraught with problematic aspects, and, like the identities of the spectators 
who view them, they are complex and need to be treated as such.  
My project is to question how, why, and to whom these particular images mean 
and what those meanings can offer. Both Black Swan and The Kids Are All Right have 
certainly not been touted as the quintessential cinematic lesbian representation; they have 
                                                          
5
 I will elaborate on the meaning of this concept later in the piece.  
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received their fair share of criticism. However, the questions I pose have nothing to do 
with the correctness of their politics, or their closeness to exhibiting the social reality of 
lesbianism. In fact, analyzing the political correctness of these two films is to assume that 
lesbian identity is a homogenous category in which the constituency all has the same 
political values. Formations of identity are often articulated as contradictory by subjects 
themselves; identity is articulated in various discourses, in various ways, at various 
levels. Because of this, we do not experience a film solely through any one aspect of 
identity.  
My analysis of Black Swan will somewhat hinge on its genre placement as a 
horror film. If the purpose of horror films is to show us our worst fears, to make us 
question our own identity as human beings, then Black Swan necessarily fits into this 
genre. Nina experiences the precariousness of human identity in several ways; she loses 
her identity through her descent into insanity, she has delusions of herself as an Other that 
is psychically present, she literally loses her human identity by transforming into a swan, 
and finally, she loses her assumed exclusive heterosexual identity when she has sex with 
another woman. Not only does Black Swan contain frightening scenes, it also deals with 
vulnerability, alienation, the horror of the unknown, the fear of losing one‘s identity and, 
most importantly, the fear of (female) sexuality.  
In this section, I will attempt to theorize the character of Nina as a hypothetical 
lesbian heroine that is at once depicted as a hysteric; in doing so, I hope to uncover the 
subversive and transgressive powers which disidentification offer the lesbian spectator. 
What are the stakes for the spectator when the disidentificatory site is characterized as 
10 
 
doubly marginalized, doubly deemed unintelligible; as the hysteric which is 
simultaneously inside and outside of the symbolic order and as the ‗lesbian‘ which as 
Butler states, ―…is not explicitly prohibited in part because it has not even made its way 
into the thinkable, the imaginable, that grid of cultural intelligibility that regulates the real 
and the nameable‖ (360).  
The Kids are All Right however, depicts a lesbian ‗nuclear family‘. A more 
masculine woman (Annette Benning) plays the ‗man‘, who has a job and supports her 
wife, the more feminine ‗woman‘ (Julianne Moore), as well as her two teenage children, 
a boy and a girl. While this depiction of a queer family structure could be critiqued as 
being a copy of a heterosexual marriage, I argue that it is precisely through this 
mimicking of a heterosexual relationship that destabilizes the very idea of the 
heteronormative family structure.
6
  
Much criticism
7
  about this film is centered on the fact that it shows a 
heteronormative family structure and that much of the plot deals with an affair between 
one of the lesbians and a man, who happens to be the family‘s sperm donor. Again, I 
chose this film because it depicts a range of sexualities and pushes the boundaries of who 
can and cannot call themselves a ‗lesbian‘. Rather than demarcating what actions do or 
do not make someone a lesbian, this film portrays a self-identified lesbian who has sex 
                                                          
6
 This discussion will apply Butler’s notion of imitation: “If heterosexuality is an impossible imitation of 
itself, and imitation that performatively constitutes itself as the original, then the imitative parody of 
“heterosexuality” –when and where it exists in gay cultures—is always and only an imitation of an 
imitation, a copy of a copy, for which there is no original. Put in yet a different way, the parodic or 
imitative effect of gay identities works neither to copy nor to emulate heterosexuality, but rather, to 
expose heterosexuality as an incessant and panicked imitation of its own naturalized idealization” (Butler, 
362). 
7
 Walters (2012); See Gupta (2013, p110-114) for a discussion of criticism from feminist and queer 
responses. 
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with a man and yet continues to self-identify as a lesbian. There are many ways in which 
one could find this film problematic; but, berating it for its flaws is not my goal. I seek to 
look at this depiction of a lesbian relationship and analyze it for the opportunities it offers 
for a range of queer identifications —not just normative lesbian sexuality. 
Black Swan and The Kids Are All Right both have representations of lesbian 
sexuality that could potentially be viewed as problematic and ‗negative‘; however, 
through the use of Munoz‘s notion of disidentification, I will show how these images can 
be appropriated for the benefit of lesbian and queer spectators. Munoz sees 
disidentification as a survival strategy for queers which works both within and outside of 
the dominant sphere simultaneously (5). It allows for looking at a cultural text and 
interrogating the problematic aspects while using other aspects as a still valuable, yet 
mediated site for identification. Munoz‘s notion of disidentifcation is an elaboration of 
previous ideas, namely Richard Dyers‘ reworking of Levi-Strauss‘ bricolage and Eve 
Sedgewick‘s notion of queer subjectivity formation in childhood. Sedgwick states that 
 
for many of us in childhood the ability to attach intently to a few cultural objects, 
objects of high or popular culture or both, objects whose meaning seemed 
mysterious, excessive, or oblique in relation to the codes most readily available 
to us, becomes a prime resource for survival. We needed for there to be sites 
where the meanings didn‘t line up tidily with each other, and we learned to invest 
those sites with fascination and love… (3). 
 
  
 For Munoz, the term ‗disidentification‘ exhibits just that: ―To disidentify is to 
read oneself and one‘s own life narrative in a moment, object, or subject that is not 
culturally coded to ‗connect‘ with the disidentifying subject‖ (12). Although 
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disidentification allows the subject to read oneself into the text at hand, it does not simply 
mean to pick and choose what one identifies with. Rather, it is ―the reworking of those 
energies that do not elide the ‗harmful‘ for contradictory components of any identity. It is 
an acceptance of the necessary interjection that has occurred in such situations‖ (Munoz, 
12). Disidentification is informed very much by Foucauldian understandings of power 
and discourse: ―…disidentification is a strategy that resists a conception of power as 
being a fixed discourse. It understands that counter discourse, like discourse can always 
fluctuate for different ideological ends…‖ (19). That is, disidentifcation is a reworking of 
cinematic images by the subject where a counter discourse can be articulated.  
As Foucault says, ―…we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between 
accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the 
dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in 
various strategies‖ (101). Then, rather than viewing these particular lesbian 
representations as ‗negative‘ images that stem from a heteronormative discourse, the 
subject can disidentify with them in order to enact a counter discourse: ―We must make 
allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of 
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy‖ (Foucault, 101). 
 Ultimately, disidentification is enacted as a survival strategy by a minority subject 
in order to resist and confound socially prescriptive patterns of identification (Munoz, 
28). The practice of disidentification gives spectators a third identificatory option rather 
than wholly disavowing the representations or completely assimilating into a 
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heterosexual matrix. Instead, it is ―a partial disavowal of that cultural form that works to 
restructure it from within‖ (Munoz, 28). Disidentification holds transformative power for 
the spectator. Queer viewers of Black Swan and The Kids Are All Right, then, are not just 
passive receptacles possessed by the paradigms of identification that these narratives 
produce, ―rather, they are active spectators who can mutate and restructure stale patterns 
within dominant media‖ (Munoz, 29).  
 Instead of conceiving of the spectators of these two films as helpless subjects 
forced to identify with the images which are shown to them, through disidentification, the 
spectators can actively resist the encoded directives to watch and identify as a 
heterosexual, or in the case of these two particular films, as a ‗normative‘ lesbian 
(Munoz, 28). Regardless of the critiques of these particular lesbian representations as 
being ‗negative‘, there exists a point of resistance for lesbian spectators
8
 through the use 
of disidentification:  
 
Disidentification is about recycling and rethinking encoded meaning. The process 
of disidentification scrambles and reconstructs the encoded message of a cultural 
text in a fashion that both exposes the encoded message‘s universalizing and 
exclusionary machinations and re-circuits its workings to account for, include, 
and empower minority identities and identifications. Thus disidentification is a 
step farther than cracking open the code of the majority; it proceeds to use this 
code as raw material for representing a disempowered politics or positionality 
that has been rendered unthinkable by dominant culture (Munoz, 31).  
                                                          
8
 While, of course, for this project and others like it, there is some essentializing done to the category of 
‘lesbian’ when referring to spectators; it is necessary to articulate a somewhat cohesive idea of sexual 
identity from which to theorize. And in doing so, diversity among subjects under the lesbian-signifier are 
elided. Throughout this project I use the term ‘lesbian’ to describe a subject “who enter a cinema or video 
store with a self-named identity as lesbian” (Whatling, 5). In taking the speculative spectator to be a self-
named lesbian, there is an attempt to account for some individual differences in the spectator. Like 
Whatling, I understand that using the terms ‘lesbian spectator’ implies a commonality of vision, and 
“Inferences of lesbian commonality are fraught with dangers, however, and thus for safety’s sake, the 
lesbian subject most clearly implied in this *project+ is…myself” (5).  
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It is important to note that disidentification is not a process that only takes place 
when viewing cinematic images, ―Disidentifications are strategies that are called on by 
minoritarian subjects throughout their everyday life‖ (Munoz, 179). But, by using Black 
Swan and The Kids Are All Right as examples of opportunities for disidentification, it is 
possible to interrogate and further transmit these practices.  
Another author who is crucial to this project is Chris Straayer given her work in 
queer film theory. The text I will be drawing from is Deviant Eyes, Deviant Bodies, in 
which Straayer introduces a queer viewpoint into feminist film theory where she raises 
―questions and proposes strategies that reveal subtexts and subversive readings in a more 
complex system than the patriarchal heterosexual system assumes‖ (2). Following 
Straayer, within this project I seek to prioritize the interdependence of author, text, and 
viewer rather than simply analyzing them individually. Straayer works against the idea 
that queer spectators‘ desire is inherently suppressed by film conventions; instead, she 
asserts that ―homosexual desire incites a critical disruption that uncovers radical viewing 
practices and generates momentous questions about textual flexibility‖ (3).  
Straayer believes that feminist film theory has much to gain from considering 
lesbian desire and sexuality because women‘s desire for other women deconstructs the 
male-female sexual dichotomy (9). Therefore, the interrogation of lesbian desire in 
cinematic representations holds opportunity: ―Acknowledgement of the female-initiated 
active sexuality and sexualized activity of lesbians has the potential to reopen a space in 
which heterosexual women as well as lesbians can exercise self-determined pleasure‖ 
(Straayer, 9).  
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However, in her analysis, Straayer is only concerned with films that do not 
explicitly depict lesbianism, but only offer sites for lesbian intervention in the text. Both 
of the films I will be interrogating have very explicit lesbian representations. In Black 
Swan, while there is ample opportunity in the text for lesbian intervention, there is a 
particular scene where Nina and Lily have sex. In The Kids Are All Right, the two main 
characters are self-identified lesbians in a committed relationship. While keeping 
Straayer‘s useful analysis in mind, I am led to ask certain questions: What are the options 
for a lesbian viewer when the film does explicitly depict lesbian acts? Are Straayer‘s 
formulations still a viable tool for analysis? I will attempt to come back to these questions 
later. 
 However, one notion from Straayer that is particularly useful in analyzing Black 
Swan is the term ‗hypothetical lesbian heroine‘, which she uses to indicate that ―neither 
the character‘s lesbianism nor her heroism is an obvious fact…‖ (9). I insist that Nina‘s 
‗lesbianism‘ is not an obvious fact of the film because, like Straayer, I understand 
‗lesbian‘ to be an incoherent identity category: ―In other words, lesbianism has no 
absolute condition, no defining criteria by which to judge oneself or others as lesbian. 
There is no lesbian referent‖ (Straayer, 29).  
The notion of the hypothetical lesbian heroine exemplifies disidentification: ―The 
lesbian heroine in narrative film must be conceived as a viewer construct, short circuiting 
the very networks that attempt to forbid her energy. She is constructed through 
contradictions within the text and between text and viewer, who insists on assertive, even 
transgressive, identification and seeing‖ (Straayer, 10). The lesbian spectator of Black 
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Swan is very much positioned to not only see Nina as not a lesbian, but also see her as a 
tragic figure rather than a heroine. To disidentify with Nina in order to still find her a 
productive and useful site for identification by a lesbian spectator shows the subversive 
potential of rearranging certain stereotypes of female sexuality.  
Nina is the hypothetical lesbian heroine in another way as well. While Nina 
exhibits same sex desire for Lily, she also has heterosexual sexual encounters. Straayer 
argues that, like in all films, lesbian films are under pressure to adhere to the convention 
of climactic coupling; ―In mainstream films about lesbians, only one bond needs to be 
broken in order to restore the façade of exclusive heterosexuality‖ (32). If this is true, 
then Nina‘s sexuality is doubly ambiguous; because her ‗lesbianism‘ is never an explicit 
fact, and because she erotically engages with a man. Yet, contradictions still arise. 
Because Nina is shown having sex with a woman as well as taking part in 
heterosexuality, the reading of this narrative could go either way and allow for the 
spectator to create multiple and ambivalent interpretations: ―These very contradictions 
and opposing intentions cause the gaps and ambiguous figurations that allow lesbian 
readings‖ (Straayer, 21). Perhaps the narrative does try to abort the possibility of a 
homoerotic relationship between Nina and Lily, yet there is an opportunity for 
disidentification here that allows the lesbian spectator to rework the narrative and, if not 
see Nina herself as a lesbian, at least see her as exhibiting lesbian-like tendencies. This 
practice of disidentification certainly does not replace the heterosexual film event, ―but, 
rather offers additions and alternative to account for homosexual viewership and desire‖ 
(Straayer, 22).  It is possible to view Nina‘s journey as being confined by the structures of 
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heteronormativity. She is sexually inexperienced, encouraged by a man to be more 
sexual, has sex with a woman, and presumably dies at the end. We could view this as her 
deviant sexuality being punished; yet, it is also possible to disidentify with this 
representation of Nina and view her as depicting sexual fluidity. 
Instead of seeing this particular representation of female sexuality as negative, we 
can view the representation of Nina‘s sexual identity in a more complex light, one that 
acknowledges identity ―is provisional, ever precarious, dependent upon and constantly 
changed by an unstable relation of unconscious forces, changing social and personal 
meanings, and historical contingencies‖ (Straayer, 36). Keeping this in mind will help to 
complicate understandings of sexuality and cinematic representations of sexuality. It is 
also possible to productively disidentify with the cinematic representation in The Kids 
Are All Right. We must recognize the problematic aspects of the film, such as the 
treatment of people of color, and rework the film into something useful. If we view the 
film in this particular way, it is possible to critically analyze the film for its problematic 
aspects while simultaneously engaging with it as a vehicle for imaging alternative 
familial structures.  
Much of the previous scholarship on cinematic representations of homosexuals 
has either focused on male homosexuality, overlooking female sexuality and demarcating 
‗lesbians‘ as invisible or, in my opinion, focuses too much on psychoanalysis and the 
effects of lesbian representations on female spectators. In my search for sources to 
incorporate in this thesis, I did my best to exclude books whose focus was on male 
homosexuality and instead acquired books which focused specifically on lesbians. Even 
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in my attempts to do so, there were a few books concerned with Queer Cinema—and 
these still seemed to highlight male homosexuality over female homosexuality. Other 
books analyze and explore only avant-garde, independent, art house, classic cinema, or 
specifically ‗lesbian films‘, which leaves a gap in scholarship on lesbian representations 
in mainstream popular cinema. 
When some scholarship highlights lesbian representations in mainstream popular 
cinema, it seems to situate it in a binary, demarcating these portrayals as having the 
potential to be detrimental to lesbian spectators (Jenkins, 2005; Kaplan, 1990; Love, 
2004; Mulvey, 1975; Smelik, 1998; Walters, 2012; Weiss, 1993; Wirthlin, 2009). Too 
often in these analyses of lesbian representation in popular cinema, there seems to be an 
implicit assumption that spectators are passive receptacles that do not hold any 
interpretive power (Kaplan, 1990; Mulvey, 1975; Smelik, 1998). I however will 
hopefully show that it is ultimately ―we who complete the thoughts of film, who decide, 
if we so wish, on the ideas to be gained from a film‖ (Frampton, 10).  It is important to 
critically investigate mainstream cinema rather than dismissing it as simply a vehicle for 
the dominant ideology. While mainstream cinema may very well be nothing more than 
the telling and re-telling of the dominant ideology, I believe it still has the potential to 
reach and influence the widest audience.
9
 
In 1991, Bad Object-Choices published How Do I Look?: Queer Film and Video 
which is a book of six papers presented at a conference in 1988 all dealing with queer 
                                                          
9
 I agree with Benshoff and Griffin in viewing that “…it is within the sphere of popular culture that many 
people probably learn what they do know about sex and sexuality…” (2). Therefore, if these two films 
were able to reach a wide audience, it would stand to reason that they had or have some sort of influence 
on the way we view sexuality.  
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representation in film. Much of the scholarship deals with analyzing queer 
representations in sexually explicit material and two of the chapters are dedicated 
explicitly to female homosexuality: Judith Mayne‘s ―Lesbian Looks‖ and Teresa de 
Lauretis‘ ―Film and the Visible.‖ In ―Lesbian Looks: Dorothy Arzner and Female 
Authorship,‖ Mayne explores in depth one of Arzner‘s films, Dance, Girl, Dance (1940) 
and the tensions surrounding Arzner‘s lesbian authorship and her supposed identification 
as a lesbian.  Mayne offers a detailed analysis of Arzner and her reception by feminist 
film studies and gay and lesbian studies; maintaining that there is a difference in how 
Arzner and her films are represented in each respective field. Feminist film studies seem 
to investigate her films and the ambiguous representation of lesbian desire and gay and 
lesbian studies seems to only be concerned with the fact that Arzner‘s particular dress and 
style characterizes her as a lesbian. Feminist film theorists latched on to Arzner‘s work 
because she was a famous female director, the focus was not on her personal sexual 
orientation; gay and lesbian studies seem to focus more on the fact that her style and 
presentation codes her as being a lesbian.  
While this piece wasn‘t necessarily useful to my project, it does raise interesting 
questions about lesbian authorship and lesbian narrative content and if the two must 
always be compatible. Mayne argues that Arzner‘s identity as a lesbian was integral in 
her construction of female-female desire within her films. This is an interesting question; 
but, in keeping with Barthes‘ notion of the death of the author, it could be seen that 
giving these films a director, ―is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final 
signified, to close the writing‖ (Barthes, 147). While it is important to look at Azner‘s 
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authorship, one should keep in mind who is speaking, the text or the author, and what sort 
of limits does that impose or options does it open up? I, however, do not necessarily 
believe that one must ―be a lesbian‖ in order to make a film that represents lesbians, 
lesbian desire, or female same-sex experiences.  
De Lauretis‘ ―Film and the Visible‖ explores the film She Must Be Seeing Things 
(1987) in regards to lesbian representation and spectatorship. She uses psychoanalysis 
and the idea of lesbian fantasy and the effects on and options this representation offers for 
lesbian spectators. In her exploration of this film, she focuses extensively on fantasy and 
the construction of lesbian desire and argues that the film‘s reclamation of fantasy and 
voyeurism is important because it specifically rearticulates it in lesbian terms. This idea 
of fantasy and voyeurism is extremely important to my analysis of Black Swan and I 
intend to use de Lauretis‘ argument about visible ‗lesbian‘ desire in my paper. As de 
Lauretis shows, it is what is visible, what can be seen, that is what is really important in 
this film; it seems to me, that whether it is a ‗fantasy‘ or not is of lesser importance than 
the fact that lesbian desire is explicitly articulated on screen. This piece is extremely 
pertinent to my investigation into the visible ‗lesbian‘ desire in Black Swan and what this 
means for female spectators—lesbian or heterosexual.  
In Vampires and Violets: Lesbians in Film, Andrea Weiss focuses on what she 
believes are significant changes in the visual representations of lesbianism and explores 
the meanings behind the changes in representation and what this could potentially mean 
for lesbian spectators. In her investigation, Weiss chronologically maps the changes in 
representations from the Silent Era to Post-War to Lesbian Independent film while also 
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historically situating the representations. It seems that Weiss finds many of the 
representations problematic, but as she states in the beginning, we must look for the 
visible and invisible as forms of representation (2) and keep in mind the various ways 
lesbians were and are still able to subvert aspects of cinema in order to construct 
identities. She believes that we must look for signs within the films that would have 
different meanings for lesbian spectators than they do for western culture at large (2). In 
looking at the visible and reading into the invisible, lesbian spectators are able to subvert 
dominant Hollywood cinematic codes and still find pleasure in mainstream cinema; ―In 
more recent films that naturalize lesbian desire…lesbians can either invent their own 
narratives that allow the lesbianism to be enacted or can become engaged with the film 
through an attraction to one of the characters‖ (83). While Vampires is slightly outdated, 
it still offers relevant criticisms that can be used to analyze lesbian representations today.  
In Immortal, Invisible: Lesbians and the Moving Image, Tasmin Wilton builds on 
what Weiss started—it is the first collection of essays devoted to lesbians and the moving 
image. The book combines varying perspectives from sociology, feminism, queer theory, 
psychoanalysis, and literary theory in order to ―make space in film studies and cultural 
studies for the specificity of lesbian thinking, lesbian oppression and lesbian resistance‖ 
(3). Following again the path of Weiss, this collection aims to create meaning out of both 
the visible and invisible.  All of the essays included are relevant in one way or another to 
my paper, but specifically ―On Not Being Lady Macbeth‖ which challenges the dominant 
psychoanalytic paradigm that prevails in explaining lesbian spectators. Wilton instead 
suggests that we should attempt to analyze spectating from a sociological perspective 
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because lesbian visual pleasure is ‗not allowable‘ in psychoanalytic film theory. Ros 
Jennings‘ ―Desire and Design‖ is also an important piece because of the analysis of 
Ripley, the main character in the Alien films. Jennings argues that the character of Ripley 
encapsulates many different sexual possibilities because her sexual orientation is never 
explicitly discussed. This argument would lend well to my analysis of the character Nina 
Sayers in Black Swan. Overall, the collection of essays in Immortal, Invisible are all very 
pertinent even while being dated. 
Chris Straayer‘s Deviant Eyes, Deviant Bodies: Sexual Re-Orientation in Film 
and Video looks to ‗queer‘ feminist film theory by arguing for a reworking of the 
heterosexist assumptions inherent in most film theory. Straayer says ―Although numerous 
works by feminist film theorists allude to a lesbian perspective as a potentially disruptive 
force, few have activated that potential within their theory‖ (5) and calls for an alternative 
understanding of the opportunities which the cinematic experiences offers. Straayer 
analyzes a number of different sources, some explicitly gay and lesbian in content and 
even some texts which she refers to as ‗by nonstraight heterosexuals‘, meaning people 
who are heterosexual in orientation but push against the privileged status it represents. 
This idea is extremely useful—Straayer views sexuality and gender on a continuum 
rather than as binaries.  
Clare Whatling‘s Screen Dreams: Fantasising Lesbians in Film, unlike many 
books, is not necessarily concerned with looking for visual representation of the lesbian 
figure; rather, she is concerned with the opportunities for appropriating the text in order 
to satisfy her own lesbian desires. This book is different from any of the other sources I 
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encountered in the sense that at the beginning, Whatling makes explicitly clear that she is 
discussing films that specifically affected her and analyzing the experiences and 
pleasures she felt as a spectator with lesbian desire.  
She argues that there is no such thing as a ‗lesbian‘ film and that the power of 
interpretation and appropriation lies with the desire of the spectator. Whatling believes 
―[the spectator] has enormous power to shape the meaning of a given film text, and, if she 
recognizes herself as a lesbian…, enormous investment in appropriating the films she 
loves to her own desires‖ (7). I find Whatling‘s argument compelling, useful, and 
empowering—throughout the book she gives power to the spectator rather than assuming 
they are passive receptacles to the films insidious meanings. Whatling employs a 
psychoanalytic framework in her analysis of mostly mainstream U.S. films; but, she takes 
the psychoanalytic terminology and reframes it through a lesbian perspective.  Her 
reframing of psychoanalysis in order to account for lesbian sexual desire is vastly 
important; all too often in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic schools of thought, 
lesbians do not exist and there is no way to take into account lesbian desire. In exploring 
lesbian cinematic desire, Whatling uses a modified psychoanalytic framework to 
―explode the traditional demarcation between being and having through the figure of the 
femme lesbian whose potential desire for another femme destabilizes the conventions by 
which lesbian cinematic desire is understood‖ (7).  
In Daughters of Desire: Lesbian Representations in Film, Shameem Kabir 
analyzes lesbian representations in film while not only taking into account heterosexist 
assumptions, but also assumptions bound up in race and class. Kabir calls for an entirely 
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new social order rather than just turning the existing one on its head; one where ―subjects 
have actual and not abstract rights to equal subjectivities, and where black and white 
subjects, men and women, lesbians and gays, can accommodate the plurality of 
positionings that we all necessarily occupy, in a politics of inclusion and a feminine 
economy of exchange and not exploitation‖ (8). Kabir believes it is not enough to simply 
challenge the dominant order, but instead we must actively engage in changing it. Instead 
of taking a negative view on the representations of lesbians in cinema, she seeks to 
enlarge the space available to include the vast range of all lesbian experiences. Kabir‘s 
stance on film is extremely interesting; she is very self-reflexive about her situatedness 
and about how she views film‘s potential for changing the existing social order. The only 
flaw I found in this book was the fact that Kabir is not a scholar, and while her views and 
opinions are very valuable and relevant, it‘s not technically a ‗scholarly‘ piece of work. 
Kabir also explores subversive and oppositional readings of the texts she presents, and 
insists on embracing contradictions within them ―as a way of destabilizing conventional 
practices‖ (230).  
Patricia White‘s study of lesbian representation is concerned solely with classical 
Hollywood cinema whose content was governed by the strict Production Code 
Administration. Uninvited draws on queer and feminist film theory, especially feminist 
psychoanalysis, and looks at how Hollywood films of the past gives pleasure to lesbian 
spectators and how these films ―have constructed our very psychosocial identities and 
possibilities of self-representation‖ (17).White argues that while there were certain 
prohibitions mandated by the PCA, it was impossible to eliminate all lesbian inference. 
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She maintains that lesbian representability was not so much ‗eliminated‘, rather it was 
directed into different channels and was still able to visually signify queerness even when 
it could not be explicitly stated. While White‘s analysis only looks at classical Hollywood 
cinema, her reworking of visibility and representation are intriguing.  
New Queer Cinema, a collection of essays compiled by Michele Aaron, 
investigates the wave of queer films that gained popularity in the 1990s. While I would 
not be engaging with all of the pieces in this book, the chapter titled ―The New Queer 
Spectator‖ by Michele Aaron is useful for my project. Aaron argues that while queer 
representations are becoming more prevalent in mainstream cinema, it is only a very 
specific type of queerness that is accepted—a heterosexualized version of queerness. She 
also argues that as queerness and queer representation moves into the mainstream, it is 
losing its critical edge; and while she believes there have been important developments in 
new queer cinema, we should not have unchecked optimism.  
Finally, Queer Images examines over a hundred years of queerness in American 
cinema, surveying a number of different genres from cult films, to documentaries, to 
Hollywood and deals with issues such as gay stereotypes and queer audiences. This book 
historically situates a number of representations of queerness within film. I think this 
book will help ground my work in a historical context rather than my work being 
completely theoretically based.  
In researching scholarship on lesbian representation in cinema, it was difficult for 
me to find any literature directly dealing with Black Swan and The Kids Are All Right. 
Gibson and Wolske‘s article ―Disciplining Sex in Hollywood: A Critical Comparison of 
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Blue Valentine and Black Swan‖, argues that Black Swan perpetuates the idea of the 
lesbian as spectacle. The article heavily emphasizes the notion of the male gaze and 
contends that the representation of female sexuality in Black Swan follows ―conventional 
scripts of the male gaze to code women's bodies as objects of male desire and to 
discipline the expression of female sexuality‖ (86). Gibson and Wolske further argue that 
the ―visual and narrative framing reinforce the power of the panoptical male connoisseur 
by presenting female-female sexuality as a spectacle, by conflating female sexuality with 
mental illness, and by punishing the expression of female sexuality‖ (86). While I do not 
agree with this argument and actually find it to be a very surface-level critique, it will be 
useful to incorporate another viewpoint into my analysis.  
In ―Debating Black Swan: Gender and Horror‖, two scholars, Mark Fisher and 
Amber Jacobs, discuss and disagree about the meaning behind the film. Fisher views 
Black Swan to be a sort of ―Irigrayian‖ horror film
10
 that is subversive in its 
representation of female sexuality, while Jacobs sees this film as nothing more than a 
male masturbatory fantasy. Jacobs argues that this film perpetuates and romanticizes the 
parameters of patriarchal imagery rather than challenging them as Fisher believes. This 
article takes a psychoanalytic stance of deconstructing Black Swan and both authors put 
Luce Irigaray‘s ideas into conversation with the film. Both of these authors bring up 
important questions about the function of femininity and female sexuality under 
patriarchy; and it is interesting that within the article, there are two completely different 
                                                          
10
 “That, I suppose, is why I would consider it a work of Irigarayan horror: Black Swan gives us many of 
Irigaray’s negative images of female subjectivity under patriarchy but without laying open any possibility 
of an alternative” (61).  
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viewpoints about the same film. Fisher believes it offers options for the subversion of 
patriarchy while Jacob blames Aronofsky for perpetuating the ―mythologies of 
femininity‖ (62). I am more inclined to agree with Fisher‘s reading of the film; I believe 
Jacob falls into the trap of automatically writing this film off as a negative representation 
of female sexuality by naming it ―psychic junk‖ (62) and a male masturbatory fantasy. 
One of my goals in the reading of Black Swan is to push against any inclination to name 
it as negative or ―junk‖ and my intention is to attempt to offer a complex reading of this 
film.    
In ―Picturing Space for Lesbian Nonsexualities: Rethinking Sex-Normative 
Commitments through The Kids Are All Right (2010)‖, Gupta examines lesbian sexuality, 
and nonsexuality, in The Kids Are All Right as well as feminist and queer responses to the 
film. Gupta argues that the film pushes the category of ‗lesbian‘ to include asexuality and 
nonsexuality and believes that feminist and queer responses to the film reject 
nonsexuality as an aspect of the lesbian experience. Gupta‘s argument is very helpful to 
my project, as it examines The Kids Are All Right for an aspect of lesbian sexuality that is 
outside the normative idea of ‗lesbian‘. This article brings to light an excellent point: in 
analyzing lesbian cinematic representations, we need to take into account all aspects of 
sexuality and push against the sex-normative assumptions inherent in the categories of 
‗lesbian‘ and ‗sexuality‘.  
Walters, however, critiques the representation of lesbian sexuality and gay kinship 
structures in The Kids Are All Right in ―The kids are all right but the lesbians aren‘t: 
Queer kinship in US culture.‖ She argues that the representation of this lesbian couple is 
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essentially heterosexual through its assertion of a generic, ―universal‖ love story (923). 
Walters believes that the universality of this film results in ―a de-gaying of gayness; the 
reliance on heteronormative gender paradigms so that the women are depicted as – really 
– just like our neighbors down the street where daddy goes out to work and mommy stays 
at home; the invisibility of lesbian culture and lesbian friends‖ (926). While Walters‘ 
argument is an important one, I will attempt to move away from this critique while still 
keeping it in mind. In my analysis of this film, I do not disagree with the 
heterosexualization of the marriage; rather, I contest that the ―heterosexualization‖ of this 
particular lesbian representation enables us to see heterosexuality as ―an impossible 
imitation of itself, an imitation that performatively constitutes itself as the original…‖ 
(Butler, 362).  
While I approach this analysis as a student of theory, the underlying motivation 
for this theoretical endeavor is my passion for movies. I will attempt to write as someone 
who has deeply visceral, emotional responses to the cinema and I will try to not pretend I 
am above being affected by film. I do not wish to analyze these two films from an 
objective viewpoint; rather, I seek to analyze them from a scholarly stance as well as 
from the stance of a lesbian spectator who was affected by these films. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
QUEER FAILURES: DISIDENTIFYING WITH BLACK SWAN 
 
 
Darren Aronofsky‟s 2010 psychological thriller/horror film, Black Swan, follows 
a young ballerina, Nina Sayers, who loses her sanity after being cast as the grueling lead 
role as both the Black and White Swans in a rendition of Swan Lake. While the film was 
certainly critically acclaimed, being nominated for five Academy Awards and Natalie 
Portman taking the Oscar for Best Actress, reviews of the films range from it being hailed 
as “brilliant”
1
 to “unimpressive”
2
. Often in the reviews, Portman is lauded as a tour de 
force, or Aronofsky‟s technique and the film‟s technical marvel are commended as 
masterful.
3
 Some critiques have been leveled that the film is vastly pretentious, lacks 
subtlety, works predominantly through clichés, and is crafted by B-movie horror 
shenanigans.
4
   
Regardless of the praise or the contempt for this film in its entirety, there is one 
particular scene that has received a lot of attention; albeit it, not of the critical and 
thoughtful kind. In the middle of the film, there is a scene between Natalie Portman and 
Mila Kunis in which they have what is culturally understood as „lesbian‟ sex Nina 
(Portman) and Lily (Kunis) engage in an ecstasy-fueled „lesbian‟ tryst, a scene which, 
unfortunately, has received very little insightful commentary. In a review of the film done 
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by Lesbian News Magazine, the only discussion of the sex scene between Nina and Lily 
was “The steamiest sex scene between two women in a studio film this year is probably 
the one between…Natalie Portman and…Mila Kunis…We saw it and it was hot.”  
While some critiques of female sexuality represented in Black Swan are more 
concerned with the pleasing aesthetics, one particular analysis looks at masochism, 
“…the trope of female desire gone awry, and the representation of sexual violence 
directed against one‟s own body” within the film (Ritzenhoff, 110). Karen Ritzenhoff 
argues that while Nina is in charge of her own sexuality, she fails in the capacity to 
control it (127). She goes on to argue that Aronofsky shows a “regressive, dark side of 
love and sexuality, an outgrowth of women‟s liberation that has ultimately gotten out of 
control when women determine their own fate” (127). For Ritzenhoff, Nina‟s sexuality is 
a consequence of “The sexual revolution that has allowed women to make choices about 
their reproductive rights and partners…” but rather than freeing Nina, it has regressed 
into sexual abstinence which unleashes a “repressed, dysfunctional, and ultimately 
destructive sexual fantasy” (115). The sexual fantasy in question is none other than the 
sex scene between Nina and Lily—which Ritzenhoff cites as the „dysfunctional‟ 
epicenter of Nina‟s psychical unraveling.  
Like Ritzenhoff, many reviewers decry this scene as nothing more than a 
sensationalized sex scene between two attractive women which panders to the Mulvian 
„male gaze‟. Gibson and Wolske argue that the sex scene in Black Swan presents 
“female-female sexuality as a spectacle, by conflating female sexuality with mental 
illness, and by punishing the expression of female sexuality,” and in doing so, preserves 
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the dominant patriarchal order instead of challenging it (86). Rather than aligning 
themselves directly with Mulvey‟s ideation of the cinematic male gaze, Gibson and 
Wolske take up the notion of a “panoptical male connoisseur” which draws from 
Foucault‟s panoptic surveillance and adapts it to show “the ways in which women are 
subjected to an inspecting patriarchal gaze that disciplines the performance of femininity 
and the expression of female sexuality” (82). 
 They go on to assert “A phallocentric gaze…is embedded throughout our systems 
of representation, reinforcing patriarchal power relations and asserting women‟s „to-be-
looked-at-ness‟ in all realms of public and private life” (81). For Gibson and Wolske, the 
power of the male gaze is so pervasive, embedded in every aspect of cultural discourse, it 
constantly forces women to view their own bodies and sexuality through a patriarchal 
gaze, and surely film is not left unscathed by its omnipotent power. Asserting that film is 
but one site in “a network of disciplinary discourses that regulate the expression of 
female sexuality,” Gibson and Wolske ultimately go on to argue that the spectator of 
Black Swan, “…perhaps finding enjoyment in the spectacle, is also encouraged to witness 
the severe consequences of female sexual pleasure and to internalize the inspecting 
patriarchal gaze” (90). 
While this can certainly be considered a reasonable conclusion, I nonetheless 
contend that this is a very surface-level, unproductive reading of the film. As Love states, 
“Given that the lesbian is so overwritten by cliché, the central criterion for judging 
lesbian representation tends to be whether it challenges reigning clichés of the lesbian or 
capitulates to them” (121). No, Aronofsky does not challenge clichés, and cinematic 
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lesbian representations such as the scene between Nina and Lily should not be confused 
with the “truth” or “reality” of all contemporary lesbian experience; yet, neither should 
they be completely dismissed.   
In order to critically interrogate the representation of female sexuality in Black 
Swan, it is important to avoid speaking simply of spectatorship or „the spectator‟ as if 
these categories were not constituted by numerous axes of difference, including class, 
culture, sexuality, nationality, etc.; various cultural, historical, and psychical frameworks 
furnish spectators with certain references that fundamentally impact their cinematic 
experiences. It is important to keep in mind that power does not just oppress subjects, but 
it also makes them; “Furthermore, power cannot be understood to operate the same way 
in making race, class, or sexuality; different kinds of power, operating according to 
different norms and having different aims, are operative in each instance” (Salamon, 99). 
We should not assume that any one discourse has so entirely constructed an individual‟s 
cinematic experience that there is absolutely no room for alternative ways of interpreting 
the filmic representations; it is imperative that we not cast the figurative spectator as a 
passive, one-dimensional subject.  Following Foucault, we must remember that power 
and discourse are not fixed: “To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of 
discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the 
dominant discourse and the dominated one” (101). Imagining that patriarchy and its 
various discourses are fixed, eternal, ahistorical constructs implies that there is no way 
out or no other possibilities for being in the world.  
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To most productively analyze Black Swan, it is necessary to actively resist 
labeling the representation of female sexuality as either „positive‟ or „negative‟. Rather 
than arguing Black Swan perpetuates a patriarchal view of lesbian-as-spectacle, or even 
trying to recover this representation as a „positive‟ one, we need to complexly question 
the concepts of identity, stereotyping, visibility, and authenticity within the film (Hanson, 
12). Rather than simply demonizing the representation of female sexuality, we can view 
the portrayal of Nina‟s sexual identity in a more complex light, one that acknowledges 
identity “is provisional, ever precarious, dependent upon and constantly changed by an 
unstable relation of unconscious forces, changing social and personal meanings, and 
historical contingencies” (Straayer, 36).   
Regarding Black Swan in this way allows us to resist “an unproductive turn 
toward good dog/bad dog criticism and instead leads to an identification that is both 
mediated and immediate, a disidentification that enables politics” (Munoz, 9). 
Disidentification is a term descriptive of survival strategies that minority subjects use to 
“negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that continuously elides or punishes the 
existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of normative citizenship” 
(Munoz, 4). It must be made clear that the practice of disidentification is not to pick and 
choose what a subject takes out of identification; it is not to willfully ignore the shameful 
components within an identificatory possibility. Rather, for queer spectators, it is a 
process of reading between the dominant text‟s lines and actively resisting its encoded 
directives to watch and identify as a heterosexual; it is the process by which active 
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spectators can mutate and restructure patterns in dominant media from within. As Munoz 
says: 
 
Disidentification is about recycling and rethinking encoded meaning. The process 
of disidentification scrambles and reconstructs the encoded message of a cultural 
text in a fashion that both exposes the encoded message‟s universalizing and 
exclusionary machinations and recircuits its workings to account for, include, and 
empower minority identities and identifications (31). 
 
 
While the process of disidentification may not be a resistance strategy that is 
pronounced and direct, it is not wholly the act of following the dominant path in order to 
survive; “…disidentification is a survival strategy that works within and outside the 
dominant public sphere simultaneously” (Munoz, 5). What needs to be stressed here is 
that disidentification is a survival strategy:  
 
…disidentification is about cultural, material, and psychic survival. It is a 
response to state and global power apparatuses that employ systems of racial, 
sexual, and national subjugation…[It] is about managing and negotiating 
historical trauma and systemic violence (Munoz, 161). 
 
 
Because it is a survival strategy for queers, disidentification is called on by queer 
subjects throughout their everyday lives. It is a rendering of the self that provides pictures 
of possible future relations of power. Therefore, “disidentification‟s use-value is only 
accessible through the transformative politics that it enables subjects and groups to 
imagine” (Munoz, 179).  Then, it is possible to analyze how Black Swan means, to whom 
it means and in what ways, ultimately allowing for a conception of alternative ways of 
being in the world.  
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While it is important to resist thinking of Black Swan as a film with inherently 
negative portrayals of lesbianism, it is also important to resist touting the film, and the 
sex scene in particular, as an inherently positive representation; doing so would imply a 
“fixing of a hegemonic viewer, and a corresponding fixing of identification and desire” 
(Whatling, 85). That is to say, we remember not every self-identified lesbian spectator is 
the same, nor are they a lesbian in the same type of ways.  
 My project is not to valorize or vilify this representation in the name of Lesbians 
or queerness; but, rather to question how, why, and to whom these particular images 
mean and what those meanings can offer. My interrogation of Black Swan has nothing to 
do with the correctness of its politics, or its closeness to exhibiting the social reality of 
lesbianism; as Ellis Hanson states “Once I realized that movies are not necessarily good 
because they reaffirm my politics or flatter my self-esteem, I found a long history of films 
that address the question of queerness in ways that challenge my mind, delight my eye, 
and complicate my understanding of sexuality” (11). 
In this analysis, I am not seeking to recuperate this film as a „positive‟ or „good‟ 
representation of non-heteronormative sexuality, I‟m resisting the trend Ellis Hanson 
explains:   
 
We are still in the throes of a lesbian and gay campaign for so-called positive 
images, representations of sexual minorities as normal, happy, intelligent, kind, 
sexually well adjusted, professionally adept, politically correct ladies and 
gentleman who have no doubt earned all those elusive civil rights for which we 
have all been clamoring (7). 
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In the attempt to recover Nina from the queer shadows and somehow show that 
she is „normal‟ or „happy‟, to argue that Nina is a „positive‟ image, we capitulate to the 
notion that „normal‟ is something worth being. It is to buy into the notion that happiness 
and success mean money, a family, monogamy, achievement, and fulfillment. Rather 
than work to repudiate what Nina represents, I seek to embrace the figure of Nina as she 
is—as representative of the possibilities of queer failure. If queerness is the antithesis of 
heteronormative ideals, if it is the opposite of heteronormative common sense that 
equates “success with advancement, capital accumulation, family, ethical conduct, and 
hope,” then Nina embodies queer potentiality. 
 My embrace of Nina as a failure is in line with Lee Edelman‟s figurations about 
queer negativity; “Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of 
negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even 
embracing it” (4). Queer negativity in this project attempts to remain “committed to not 
only scrambling dominant logics of desire but also to contesting homogeneous models of 
gay identity within which a queer victim stands up to his or her oppressors and emerges a 
hero” (Halberstam, 147). In doing so, it resists claiming the queer characters for a project 
of homonormativity. 
I am not naming or identifying Nina as a queer; yet, Nina inhabits the figural 
position of the queer in the sense that she disturbs and disrupts “those congealments of 
identity that permit us to know and survive as ourselves” (Edelman, 17). While Nina 
exists in a queer positionality that resists cohesive, stable categories of identity through 
which individuals experience themselves as subjects, she does not, at any point, offer a 
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platform from which to articulate an oppositional politics of identity or a position of 
essential, empowering „queerness‟; she does not harbor the hope of a better, more moral 
society or a brighter tomorrow.  
In not aligning with heteronormativity and the optimism of the future, Nina‟s 
practice of failure “recognizes that alternatives are embedded already in the dominant and 
that power is never total or consistent; indeed failure can exploit the unpredictability of 
ideology and its indeterminate qualities” (88). Rather than imagining a fantasy of a queer 
elsewhere, the figure of Nina allows for conceptualizing alternatives to the existing 
hegemonic system while simultaneously avoiding the recuperation of this representation 
for a queer apologist moral project. Sometimes it is more radical to make space for what 
already is rather than envisioning a precariously utopian future. 
The embrace of Nina as embodying queer failure, and thus as “negative” in 
relation to heteronormative notions of „normality,‟ does not negate the value this 
representation holds for queer disidentification. Already adept at the interpretive survival 
strategy of disidentification, queers are able to rework an image that deviates from 
heteronormative notions of happiness and success which helps to imagine other goals for 
life and for being. 
This analysis of Black Swan is partially dependent on the fact that this movie is 
categorized as a psychological horror film. If horror films are designed to be unsettling, 
to cause fright and panic, dread and alarm, show us our worst fears—then Black Swan 
necessarily falls into this category: 
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Horror is the title I am giving to the perception of the precariousness of human 
identity, to the perception that it may be lost or invaded that we may be or may 
become something other than we are or take ourselves for; that our origins as 
human beings need accounting for and are unaccountable (Cavell, 1979; cited in 
Grant, 184). 
 
 
Not only does Nina experience first-hand the precariousness of human identity, 
she does so in several ways. Nina loses a coherent sense of her Self through her descent 
into insanity—she actively becomes something other than what she is and what she takes 
herself to be. She constantly has hallucinations and visions of herself as an Other that is 
psychically and physically present. Nina literally loses her human identity by emotionally 
and physically transforming into the Black Swan. And finally, Nina loses her assumed 
exclusive heterosexual identity when she has sex with another woman, becoming 
something other than „that which she is.‟ Not only does Black Swan deal with 
vulnerability, alienation, the horror of the unknown, the fear of losing one‟s identity; but, 
most importantly, the fear of (queer) female sexuality.  
The filmic representations of lesbians and queers within the horror genre have 
quite a long relationship. From the vampire lesbian, to the maniacal woman that loves her 
friend a little too much, to the crazed man-hating serial killer, both have certainly run the 
gamut when it comes to horror films. In horror films, the monster or villain is often coded 
as queer and their monstrosity lies in their „unnatural‟ sexuality. Like Foucault shows us, 
sexuality has become a synecdoche—it is no longer just an act someone commits, it is 
their totality; “The…homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a 
childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology…” (43). The 
monsters‟ unnatural sexuality makes them a monster, it is the unnatural core that affects 
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every aspect of them, making them unnatural as a whole. Horror films traditionally cast 
the monster as sexually disturbed or exhibiting gender confusion
1
; as Halberstam 
explains; 
  
This narrowing down of monstrous features to monstrous sex and gender has to 
do with the success of the hegemonic installation of psychoanalytic 
interpretations of human subjectivity which understand subjectivity as sexual 
subjectivity and identity as sexual identity and monstrosity as sexual pathology 
(24). 
 
 
 No matter what the case, the villain or the monster is always queer, that is, always 
outside the boundaries of normality.  
 The character of Nina is not a traditional horror film “monster” in the sense that 
she is not physically disfigured or hideous and she is not a supernatural creature or a 
serial killer; she is horrifying and monstrous because her of failure to be „normal‟.  Nina‟s 
psyche is the threat and the precariousness of the human psyche is brought to the 
forefront; we could all become Nina. Nina shows us that the true threat is not the Other, 
rather, the darkness lies within ourselves. Rather than having a monster that carries out 
physical attacks, Black Swan’s horror lays in the psychological atmosphere and 
suggestive horror effects. This of course is not a new idea, Hannibal Lecter and Norman 
Bates were also human monsters with threatening psychologies; but, Nina is something 
different. She is at once the character we root for and the one we are repulsed by; in 
Black Swan, we are aligned with the „monster‟, she is “our central character, our primary 
means of access to the events of the fictional world, and in fact our narrator” (Knight and 
                                                          
1
 Carol Clover makes this argument about killers in slasher films in Men Women and Chainsaws, p 27-28. 
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McKnight, 218). What Nina sees is what the audience sees; the hallucinations, the 
fantasies, and the transformation into a swan.  
The audience experiences the film through the experiences of Nina, so then we 
experience Nina‟s failure as well. Analyzing Black Swan as a horror film very much 
lends itself to the notions of disidentification and queer failure. In a general sense, all 
horror film villains are ultimately failures—they never line up with the „normal‟. We are 
conditioned as spectators of horror films to view these failures as „bad‟, as „negative‟, as 
exemplars of what „good‟ must defeat for order to be restored. The figure of the horror 
villain is something that no „normal‟ spectator would wish to identify with. If horror 
villains never line up with normal, then they are inherently queer; and by the same token, 
queers are used to being cast as the villain. 
 The darkness of failure, as Halberstam explains, is an important part of a „queer 
aesthetic‟: “…failure presents an opportunity rather than a dead end, in true camp 
fashion, the queer artist works with rather than against failure and inhabits the darkness. 
Indeed the darkness becomes a crucial part of a queer aesthetic” (96). According to 
Halberstam, then, darkness is as much a part of queer as queer is a part of darkness. 
Halberstam goes on to say that “the social and symbolic systems that tether queerness to 
loss and failure cannot be wished away…nor should they be” (98). Thinking of queers 
and monsters as being the same in that they are inherently sociosymbolically tied to loss 
and failure offers a productive site for queer spectators of a horror film. 
A queer spectator is able to productively rework the horror movie villain through 
the process of disidentification “whereby a toxic identity is remade and infiltrated by 
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subjects who have been hailed by such identity categories but have not been able to own 
such a label” (Munoz, 185). Disidentifying with a horror movie villain can be viewed as 
the management of a certain identity that has been viewed as „bad‟ by the hegemonic 
public sphere Disidentification is therefore about the management of an identity that has 
been spoiled in the majoritarian public sphere: “This management is a critical negotiation 
in which a subject who has been hailed by injurious speech, a name, or a label 
reterritorializes that speech act and the marking that such speech produces to a self” 
(Munoz, 185). 
Disidentification reminds us of the Foucauldian “ reverse discourse”; the queer 
spectator who disidentifies with the horror villain is able to “…speak in its own behalf, to 
demand that its legitimacy or “naturality” be acknowledged, often in the same 
vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was…disqualified” (101). In terms of 
Black Swan, Nina is cast as the hysterical female; she is paranoid, she hallucinates, she is 
a failure at creating stable, intimate relationships, her grasp on reality is tenuous, she is an 
example of how horrifying it is to lose one‟s fragile human identity. She is a tragic figure, 
she does not find love, or happiness, she does not have a happy ending; what Nina 
represents is what queers all too often hear about themselves from the public sphere. Yet, 
through the process of disidentification, queer spectators are able to step in, rework the 
notion of Nina as the hysteric, and walk away with imaginings for new and alternative 
worlds where failure is a welcome option.   
In Black Swan, Nina, a young, aspiring ballerina in New York City, is cast in a 
rendition of Swan Lake by the lascivious director, Thomas (Vincent Cassel), who seduces 
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the ingénue under the guise of pushing her to explore her untapped sexual and artistic 
expressiveness. As Thomas urges her to overcome her sexual shyness in order to 
perfectly dance the evil Black Swan, Nina begins experiencing horrifying hallucinations 
which mark her descent into madness. Burdened with the stress of perfection, Nina starts 
to break and she is ultimately brought to the dark side by rival dancer Lily, who—
effortlessly embodying the perfect Black Swan—threatens to steal Nina‟s spotlight. Nina 
loses herself, succumbing to the evil of the Black Swan, and ultimately kills herself at the 
end of Swan Lake.    
However, because the film itself is crafted by and through psychoanalytic tropes, 
nothing is what it seems on the surface. The overwhelming presence of mirrors in 
virtually every scene not only reminds us of a ballet studio, but of Jacques Lacan‟s 
“mirror stage.” Who else but Freud could write the protagonist as sexually naïve and 
child-like with an absent father and an over bearing mother, who, upon her entry into 
adult sexuality manifests symptoms of hysteria in the form of a same-gender desire? Not 
only is psychoanalytic theory present in Black Swan itself, but being a horror film, it 
seems particularly suited for a psychoanalytic interpretation. While it is important to not 
rely solely upon psychoanalysis to analyze Black Swan, ignoring the psychoanalytic 
tropes inherent within the film would be just as self-limiting. 
At the beginning of the film, Nina is immediately portrayed as juvenile: her body 
resembles a formless adolescent body and her room is riddled with childish décor. We are 
introduced to Nina as she lies in her bed, just awakening. Nina looks as though she is in 
her early to mid-twenties and although she is beautiful, it is very much in the girl next 
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door type of way. As she sits up in bed, we are able to see that the nightgown she is 
wearing is pastel pink with pink bows on it. Her bed sheets have flowers on them, her bed 
spread is pink, along the walls of her room she has a giant pink and white bunny, and her 
wallpaper has pink and white butterflies. Within the first minute of the film, we are 
introduced to Nina as if she is a little girl, and she is clearly not that little—there is a 
striking juxtaposition that is immediately present in the scene of a twenty-something 
woman waking up in the room of a 8 year old girl.  
From the very start, the character of Nina is set up as naïve, young, and fragile. It 
is only in one of the next scenes when we meet Nina‟s mother, Erica (Barbara Hershey), 
that it begins to make sense why Nina is so emotionally juvenile.  In the kitchen, Nina 
sits at the counter top waiting while her mother makes her breakfast. Erica sets down a 
plate with only half of a grapefruit and one poached egg on it. After they have a brief 
conversation, Erica walks around the counter with a sweater in hand, “Up” she 
commands Nina. Nina obeys, standing up, turning around, letting her mother put her 
sweater on for her. During this scene, she even asks Nina if she should come with her to 
the ballet studio.  This scene accompanied with the décor in Nina‟s bedroom and Nina‟s 
sleeping attire really sets the stage for Nina‟s fragile psyche. She is a twenty-something 
living with her mother, who cooks breakfast for her, dresses her, and offers to accompany 
her to her professional career. While we do not really know the extent of it yet, there is 
something obviously strange about Nina and her relationship with her mother.  
At this point in the film, before Nina even goes to the ballet studio, we understand 
that she lives a sheltered life. Her mother is very overbearing and overprotective which 
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leads her to not be able to experience life for herself; this sets the stage for Nina‟s 
neurosis. Nina is seemingly kept in a perpetual child-like state by her mother; Erica tucks 
her in at night, winds a music box for her to fall asleep, clips her finger nails, and even 
helps her get undressed. In the hysterical subject there exists simultaneously a sexual 
repression and sexual impulse. Nina‟s sexuality has very much been hindered by her 
mother, and her sexual impulse is brought about later in the film through the insistence of 
her director to be more sexual. Before sex has even been discussed in the film, we 
understand that Nina is sexually repressed; while it‟s not explicitly mentioned, the child-
like decorations in her room are a metaphor for Nina not having reached adult sexuality.   
 Thomas, the director, lets the company know that they will be doing a “stripped-
down, visceral, real version” of Swan Lake, in which one ballerina will play the role of 
both the white and black swans. The white swan is „good‟, virginal, pure, sweet, and the 
black swan is lustful and evil. Here we are presented with the major premise of the 
story—Nina is the pure, sweet, virginal swan, but how will she overcome her inhibitions 
to succeed in playing the lustful black swan? When auditions come around, Nina dances 
the white swan to perfection; Thomas says that if he were only casting the white swan, it 
would definitely be Nina. Next she dances the part of the black swan; interrupted by Lily 
barging in the door, Nina blows the audition and she leaves the studio feeling devastated.  
 Nina gets the part after all and Thomas takes her to a fundraising event for the 
ballet company in order to introduce her to everyone as the Swan Queen. After the event, 
Thomas suggests that they go back to his apartment and have a drink. As they sit down 
on the couch to discuss the role of the Swan Queen, Thomas begins by inquiring if Nina 
 
45 
 
has a boyfriend. Nina responds coyly, looking away, “No.” Thomas continues with this 
line of questioning, “You‟re not a virgin are you?” Nina is immediately embarrassed and 
made extremely uncomfortable by the question, she looks down, shakes her head, and 
whispers a very unconvincing “No.” At this point, Nina is visibly very uncomfortable and 
it is obviously because the conversation is about sex. Next, Thomas asks her if she enjoys 
having sex; she all together avoids answering this question, she just laughs 
uncomfortably and looks away. Thomas notices that she is uncomfortable with talking 
about sex, so he gives her a „homework assignment‟ which is to “Go home and touch 
yourself. Live a little.” Thomas believes that Nina‟s aversion to sex is what is holding her 
back from being the perfect black swan; if Nina was only more sexually adventurous, 
then she would be „perfect‟. The only thing Nina really wants in her life is to be „perfect‟, 
she states it numerous times throughout the film, so she is very easily sexually 
manipulated by him as a result of her trust and admiration of him. What‟s interesting here 
is that Nina does everything to strive for Thomas, there are no bounds on what she will 
do to impress him or gain his acceptance. Because the movie is so steeped in 
psychoanalytic tropes, Thomas becomes a stand-in for Nina‟s absent father and therefore 
another root of her neurosis.    
 This scene serves to show the audience just how uncomfortable Nina is when it 
comes to conversations and sex and sexuality. When Thomas asks her if she‟s a virgin, 
although she answers that she is not, it is delivered in a way that seems completely 
unconvincing. The spectator is unconvinced because we know that she lives with a 
mother who watches her every move, therefore has most likely been a source of sexual 
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repression, which leads Nina to be so vastly uncomfortable in situations where sex is 
discussed. Once Nina begins the journey into her adult sexuality, she becomes delusional, 
paranoid, and emotionally unstable; or, in the psychoanalytic context of this particular 
film, Nina becomes the hysteric. At the heart of Freud‟s notion of the hysteric lies 
sexuality: “…psychoneuroses, as far as my experience goes, are based on sexual motive 
powers…the symptoms are the sexual activities of the patient” (36). That is, hysterical 
symptoms manifest themselves through the sexual activities of the subject. 
  Hysteria, according to Freud, is caused by the contradictory existence of an 
immense sexual desire and an exaggerated sexual rejection: “In most psychoneurotics the 
disease first appears after puberty following the demands of the normal sexual life…the 
fact of the matter is that the sexual repression has to be added as an inner factor to such 
external ones as restrictions of freedom, inaccessibility to the normal sexual 
object…which cause the origin of perversions in individuals who might have otherwise 
remained normal” (41).. Nina‟s inner sexual desire, coupled with her mother‟s restriction 
of her sexual freedom and Thomas‟ urging to release her sexual inhibitions causes Nina 
to become the hysteric. She is being pulled in two opposite directions by people who 
have a large amount of influence over Nina and her life. So, according to Freud, the 
symptoms of hysteria will manifest themselves in Nina‟s sexual activities; the first being 
masturbation.  
 Nina, following Thomas‟ orders, wakes up one morning and begins to touch 
herself. As she‟s lying in bed, she slowly moves her hand under the covers. At first she 
doesn‟t know what to think, whether she likes it or not, then she takes a small gasp and 
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closes her eyes. She‟s beginning to enjoy it. As Nina gets more and more caught up in the 
moment, it seems as if she‟s close to orgasm; then, she looks over to her left only to see 
her mother asleep in a chair in Nina‟s room. Even in Nina‟s fantasy and autoerotic life, 
her mother is there to repress and stifle her sexual desires. This just goes to show the 
omnipresence of her mother‟s power over Nina‟s sexuality. 
 The push and pull of Erica and Thomas‟ influences over Nina causes a psychic 
split; Nina is at once herself and yet another Self, one that embodies her “black swan”. 
The next time Nina attempts to masturbate, she is in the bathtub alone. She begins 
touching herself and enjoying it. She takes a breath, closes her eyes and goes under the 
water; upon opening her eyes, she hallucinates her “black swan self” looking down at her 
from above. Each time Nina has been on the verge of orgasm, or releasing her repressed 
sexuality, she is stopped by something; this time, it was a hallucination of her divided 
Self.  
When Nina opens her eyes to see herself staring back, she quickly sits up, out of 
breath and terrified; this gives us the sense that Nina is genuinely scared of what is inside 
of her and scared of releasing these desires she has repressed for so long. It is in this 
scene that we are truly presented with Nina‟s increasingly tenuous grasp on reality; from 
now on, the spectator is unsure if we are seeing Nina‟s subjective reality or a concrete 
reality. In several scenes, Nina‟s reflection is moving independently of her own; 
sometimes it continues moving after she stops and in one instance, the reflection smiles 
back at her while cutting her finger. The film begins slipping between hallucinations and 
real life, which allows for the identities of Nina, the good Nina and the bad Nina, and 
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Lily to constantly be conflated  through the use of the doppelganger motif. In Freudian 
terms, the doppelganger represents the hidden or repressed aspects of the protagonist 
which the protagonist must acknowledge and confront. In film, doppelgangers are often 
signaled by reflections or by the use of a physically similar character; both of which are 
present in Black Swan.  
 There are several scenes where Nina, and also the spectator, mistakes Lily for 
herself. For Nina, Lily comes to embody the black swan, and while Nina has a version of 
her own self that is the black swan, she projects these feelings onto Lily because it offers 
her an external manifestation of Nina‟s “dark self”. Lily represents sexual liberation, 
freedom, darkness, and impulsivity, everything Nina believes she needs in order to 
succeed as the black swan.  
Interestingly, Freud also says that “In all neurotics…we find feelings of inversion 
in the unconscious psychic life, fixation of libido on persons of the same sex” (38). 
Nina‟s hysterical symptoms partially manifest themselves in her sexual attraction and her 
sexual experience with Lily. The conflation between good/bad Nina and Lily reaches its 
apex in the scene where they enter Nina‟s apartment after a night of drinking and drugs. 
When the two women enter the apartment, they are both clearly visible to the spectator; 
but, when Nina‟s mother enters, we see a shot of a segmented mirror, where in the 
reflection, Lily splits away from Nina. Lily is apparently standing in the hall while Nina 
has a drunken confrontation with her mother; yet, Nina and Lily are never shown in the 
same shot and Erica makes no reference to Lily being present. Again, the spectator is 
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presented with the slippage of fantasy and reality; there is no way to tell whether this is 
Nina‟s subjective reality, or if it is concrete.  
The confrontation between Erica and Nina escalates and  Nina takes off running 
down the hallway toward her room. The camera follows both Nina and Lily down the 
hallway as they run into Nina‟s room and shut the door. Nina and her mother are yelling 
viciously at one another while Lily is behind Nina with her hands on her shoulders; this is 
reminiscent of the devil being on one‟s shoulder. If Lily represents freedom, and sexual 
liberation, then this shot is set up to look like Lily is the voice telling Nina to rebel.  
Nina looks at Lily, quickly walks across the room and they immediately embrace 
each other and begin kissing urgently. They begin undressing each other and even their 
underwear is a glaring metaphor of the good/bad dichotomy—Nina‟s underwear is very 
simple and child-like, Lily‟s is sexy and black, complete with a garter belt. Lily proceeds 
to go down on Nina, during which Nina looks down and sees her own face rather than 
Lily‟s. Lily tells her to relax, and they continue, Nina finally comes to orgasm, 
presumably the first time ever. Afterwards, Nina once again sees her own self physically 
present instead of Lily. This entire scene, with its slippage between fantasy and reality 
can be read different ways; but, it should not be read in a way that situates Nina within a 
lesbian positionality nor should it be cited as the reason for her neuroses.  
The psychoanalytic pathologizing of non-heterosexual sexualities is not new, and 
certain not only contained in cinematic representations. Coffman states;  
 
Our contemporary understanding of sexuality and the psyche was strongly 
influenced by, though not coextensive with, the rise of psychoanalysis at the 
beginning of the century: it played a key role in putting the concept of 
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psychosexual identity into discourse and publicizing evidence of the presence of 
non-heterosexuals. (8) 
 
Contemporary popular understandings of sexuality then are culturally tied to 
psychoanalytic understandings of sexuality that emerged in the twentieth century. These 
psychoanalytic mythologies still permeate our cultural and social understandings of 
sexuality which allows psychoanalytically based films like Black Swan to be culturally 
intelligible. If we take as an absolute truth the proposition that Nina‟s psychosis stems 
from inarticulable desire for another woman, if we place the origins of hysteria within 
Nina‟s psychical interiority, then we claim that the „knowable truth‟ of Nina is placed 
squarely in her sexuality. If we apotheosize Nina‟s psychosexual development as the 
viable path to what she „actually‟ is then we run the risk of pathologizing Nina‟s actions 
and experiences without critically questioning them, thus foreclosing on productive 
opportunities for spectatorial disidentification.  
The confrontation with Nina‟s doppelganger happens during the opening night of 
Swan Lake. Nina makes it to the ballet just in time, only to find that Thomas has told Lily 
that she will be dancing the part of the Swan Queen in place of Nina. Nina refuses to let 
this happen and tells Thomas that she will be dancing the part no matter what. She enters 
her dressing room and sits down at the vanity; the audience sees Nina and her reflection 
as she puts on her Swan Queen makeup. Thomas follows her in, leans over her shoulder 
and says “The only person standing in your way is you. It‟s time to let her go. Lose 
yourself.” Here, Thomas unknowingly makes reference to the fact that there are two 
Ninas, and in doing so, he gives the audience a glimpse of what is to come.  
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Nina heads to the stage to make her entrance as the White Swan; she peeks out of 
the curtain to see that she will be dancing to a packed house, and she‟s so nervous that 
she forgets her stage directions. As she finds her place, she watches the ballet corps begin 
and once again hallucinating, Nina sees her face on all of the other ballerinas. Shaken up, 
Nina falls while she‟s dancing the White Swan. Thomas is furious, Nina is devastated; 
everything she was afraid of was coming true, she was not going to be perfect. Nina 
leaves the stage and rushes down the stairs to her dressing room to calm down and 
change costumes for the Black Swan.  
Upon her entrance into the dressing room, she sees Lily sitting at the vanity 
putting on the Black swan makeup. The camera frames Lily‟s reflection as she is talking 
to Nina and as Lily begins to turn around, the camera pans and we see that not Lily, but 
Nina is sitting at the vanity. This is the first time in the film that we see Nina actually 
confront the existence of her doppelganger. Previously in the film, when Nina sees her 
“dark self” it is only briefly in fleeting glimpses, they never talk to one another. This is 
also the first time that we see the white and the black swan Nina—before, the comparison 
between the „bad‟ Nina/black swan and „good‟ Nina/white swan was only symbolic, now 
it is explicit.  
A physical altercation ensues in which white swan Nina slams black swan Nina 
into a mirror, shattering it into pieces; this is symbolic of the breakdown of the psychic 
barrier between „good‟/„bad‟ Nina. The struggle continues between the two Ninas—the 
black swan reaches for the white swan‟s neck and begins strangling her while repeatedly 
yelling “It‟s my turn!” White swan Nina grabs a shard of broken mirror and stabs black 
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swan Nina in the side. The camera then shows white swan Nina, with red eyes 
aggressively proclaiming “It‟s my turn.” After „good‟ Nina has stabbed what she thought 
was her „bad‟ alter ego, the audience is shown that it was not really Nina at all, but Lily 
who was stabbed. Again, the audience experiences the same slippages between reality 
and fantasy as Nina. Frightened, Nina drops the shard of mirror and hears the stage 
manager say that it is almost time to start. Nina is confused and scared, she does not 
know what to do with the dead body of Lily; in a hurry, Nina stashes the body in the 
bathroom.  
The fact that Nina slams her alter-ego into the mirror and shattering it is very 
telling. No longer is Nina‟s alter-ego an idealized image she sees but can never fully 
achieve. Throughout the film, Nina has wanted to be what she saw in the mirror; the 
mirror-image was everything she was not and was perfect for the role of the Black Swan. 
When the mirror shatters, the barriers are broken down between Nina and her alter-ego, 
allowing the alter-ego to actually take complete control. Nina has fully followed the 
advice Thomas related before the show: “The only person standing in your way is you. 
It‟s time to let her go. Lose yourself.” The fact that it is ambiguous as to whether or not it 
was Nina or Lily who was stabbed is not of the most importance here, because Lily 
served as the physical embodiment of Nina‟s alter-ego. 
In the following scene, it is time for the „new‟ Nina to dance the black swan. As 
she hears the music that cues black swan‟s coda, Nina looks down at her arms to find that 
feathers are beginning to grow; she smiles, knowingly accepting that she is transforming 
into the Black Swan. As Nina begins her fouettés, the feathers on her arms are becoming 
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more and more pronounced with every turn, it is obvious now that her arms are 
transforming into wings. Finally, when Nina finishes, the camera shows a long shot of 
Nina, her arms are not in reality wings; but, the giant shadow on the back of the stage 
shows Nina with enormous swan wings. Not only has Nina psychically transformed into 
the mentality of the black swan; but, she also envisions herself physically transforming 
into an Other. Again, the cinematic technique here works to confuse the viewer as to 
what is reality; feathers and wings are visible, then they are not, Nina has red swan-like 
eyes, and then she doesn‟t. The audience does not know when we are inside of Nina‟s 
head or when we are viewing the situation at hand objectively; but, isn‟t that one of the 
horrifying aspects of being insane—not being able to differentiate between objective and 
subjective reality? 
After Nina has finished the coda, she goes back down in her dressing room to take 
care of Lily‟s body. There is blood seeping out from under the bathroom door, and Nina 
places a towel over it to soak up the mess while she prepares for the final act of the ballet. 
As Nina is finishing up her white swan makeup, she hears a knock at the door; upon 
opening it, she sees Lily staring right back at her, alive. Nina slowly turns, completely 
disoriented, surveying the dressing room to see that the mirror actually is broken. She 
goes over to the bathroom only to find that there is no blood, and there is no body hidden 
inside. Utterly confused, she begins to tear up, she reaches down only to find that rather 
than stabbing her alter-ego, or Lily, she has in fact stabbed herself. 
Nina sits down at the vanity, crying, the audience sees the expression on her face 
as she comes to the realization that she has lost her mind. Determined to finish her role as 
 
54 
 
the Swan Queen, Nina proceeds to finish her makeup in order to take the stage for the last 
scene.  Nina dances the final scene perfectly. She dances up to the top of the cliff on set, 
looks dramatically out into the audience and makes eye contact with her mother. Then, 
Nina jumps off the cliff onto a mattress, and as Thomas comes over to congratulate her 
on a wonderful performance, he sees her bleeding wound. Nina‟s last words are “I felt it. 
Perfect. It was perfect.” as the lights glare and the film goes to white while the crowd 
chants “Nina! Nina!” Like the majority of the film, there is no certainty as to whether 
Nina dies at the end, it can be interpreted in a number of ways. Again, like most of the 
film, this uncertainty, ambiguity, and refusal to be clear lends itself to various, and 
sometimes even conflicting, readings.  
While psychoanalysis as a interrogative tool should not be wholly dismissed, it is 
important to persist in reading against Black Swan‟s psychoanalytic narrative because 
“…not only is psychoanalysis required to provide a secured meta-language, but…it is 
also inseparable from the material it is being used to analyze” (Schneider, 182). Meaning, 
if we use only psychoanalysis as a deconstructive tool, we will continually discover the 
interpretation the film itself is already organized around (Schneider, 183). Another 
problematic aspect of relying solely on psychoanalysis to analyze Black Swan is that 
“...psychoanalytic readings in film theory tend toward the ahistorical inasmuch as the 
psychic structures discerned within a given film are taken to be operative independently 
of either the spectators‟ or the film‟s historical circumstances (Schneider, 182). 
Therefore, if we were to psychoanalyze Nina‟s psychosis and the film‟s effect on the 
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spectator, they would have to exist in “an eternal present determined by the unchanging 
structures of patriarchy” with no regard to historical or social circumstances.  
Here it is important to resist pathologizing Nina‟s sexual behaviors because doing 
so results in dichotomizing this cinematic representation into a „good‟ or „bad‟ 
representation rather than looking at the nuances of this representation and what it holds 
for the spectator. It is important not to label Nina as a lesbian simply because she had a 
same-gender „fantasy‟ and it is equally important, though, to not say she is completely 
heterosexual. Nina‟s sexual vacillation and fluidity is important; perhaps her sexual 
endeavors are, like Freud says, a manifestation of her hysteria. If so, this offers a 
subversive opportunity for disidentification.   
While one can assume hysteria and the descent into insanity are never something 
one would desire, through disidentification, the queer spectator can rework the figure of 
the hysteric and find it productive after all. The female hysteric is an interesting figure, in 
that she is always already doubly invisible and doubly marginalized—to define a woman 
as insane is to even further render her invisible and further exclude her from any 
semblance of agency. Yet, the hystericism of Nina can be viewed as an act of failure, 
therefore an act of resistance. The argument that hysteria can actually be a point of 
empowerment is not a new one; in writing on madness and literature, Anderson states, 
“Denied all manner of self-expression, otherwise-intelligent women may have 
unknowingly resorted to hysteria as their only mode of self-expression. Feminist critics 
have most often read “madness, whenever it appears in women‟s texts, as a willed choice 
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and a preferable alternative to sanity for women” (Caminero-Santangelo, 1, in Anderson, 
64). 
 However, my argument is not that hysteria offers empowerment to women; very 
few times, I‟m sure, is insanity a willful choice. Insanity and complete loss of a coherent 
idea of one‟s self are rarely the choice of the individual that experiences them. This is the 
horror of Black Swan; even if you know you are going insane, there‟s nothing you can do 
about it. I also am not arguing that real mental health issues are a point of resistance, and 
critically analyzing that is entirely out of the scope of this project. However, the character 
of Nina and this particular cinematic representation of hysteria can most certainly be a 
point of resistance. Looking at Nina through a queer spectator perspective, the fact that 
she is deemed „insane‟ because she is outside the bounds of normality is something very 
important. Nina presents us with a main character who fails, who goes insane, who is 
definitely not normal, and who dies at the end—Nina‟s story is not a fairy tale full of 
happy endings. We are told that it is bad when there are not happy endings, we are 
programmed to expect and to desire the „happy ending‟; which presumably means 
romantic love, family, money, material goods, etc. But, what is wrong with cinematically 
representing something other than a happy ending? Life is full of them.  
 Through Nina‟s failure, we are able to imagine otherwise. We should name failure 
not as the negative space opened up by normalized modes of success, but as a habitable 
space with its own logic and practices. Queerness is always a failure; a failure to conform 
and a failure to fit in. As Halberstam states, “To live is to fail, to bungle, to disappoint, 
and ultimately to do; rather than searching for ways around death and disappointment, the 
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queer art of failure involves the acceptance of the finite, [and] the embrace of the 
absurd…Rather than resisting endings and limits, let us revel in an cleave to all of our 
own inevitable fantastic failures” (Halberstam, 186-7). 
Rather than apologizing for our failures, we should embrace them; allow them to 
help us imagine alternative worlds that exist outside of the conventions of production, 
intimacy, and leisure. Nina may not represent „happiness‟ and she may not be a „positive‟ 
representation of female sexuality. More importantly, though, she ultimately allows us to 
interrogate a variety of ideas and structures. She makes us question happiness, what it 
entails, who can have it, and if it looks the same for everyone. She allows us to envision a 
world where „perfection‟ is achieved through failure to live a „sane‟, „normal‟, life. While 
Nina may not be queer in some senses, she is certainly queer in her failures; and 
sometimes, it is refreshing to see someone else who also just can‟t seem to get it right. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
QUEER POSSIBILITIES: DISIDENTIFYING WITH 
THE FAMILY IN THE KIDS ARE ALL RIGHT 
 
The Kids Are All Right follows the tenuous relationships of a nuclear family with 
a lesbian twist; Nic (Annette Bening) is the „man‟ of the house, the breadwinner who 
takes care of her flaky slightly-femme wife, Jules (Julianne Moore) and their two kids 
Laser (Josh Hutcherson) and Joni (Mia Wasikowska). The story follows the difficulties of 
Nic and Jules‟ long-term, committed relationship; Nic is a workaholic/alcoholic and Jules 
feels neglected and unappreciated. When Laser and Joni seek out their anonymous sperm 
donor dad, the already fragile family dynamics become even more strained.  
The Kids Are All Right was released in the summer of 2010 and immediately 
critically acclaimed, being nominated for a total of four Academy Awards including Best 
Picture and Original Screenplay. Critical praise for the film is mostly positive, calling it 
“…so canny in its insights and so agile in its negotiation of complex emotions that it 
deserves to stand on its own” and “…probing, poignant, and above all, highly 
entertaining”.  The film has been called one “…about basic things, about the meaning of 
family and the vulnerability of families…”
1
 The Kids Are All Right is so „universal‟ in its 
subject matter that Roger Ebert refuses to “call it a „gay film.‟”
2
 He goes on to say that he 
“…toyed with the idea of not even using the word “lesbian” and leaving it to [the viewer] 
                                                          
1
 http://www.sfgate.com/movies/article/Review-The-Kids-Are-All-Right-3259207.php 
2
 http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/the-kids-are-all-right-2010 
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to figure out that the couple was female.‖ Kay Shackleton says ―…it is a film more about 
families and love than it is about sexual orientation.‖ 
The consensus of mainstream film reviewers seems to be that The Kids Are All 
Right is a film that transcends sexual orientation and gender identity and gets at what is 
‗really‘ important: family. However, while this film has certainly received its fair share of 
attention in the form of critical accolades, it has also received attention in the form of 
fiercely critical analysis. Much of the critical concern about this film comes from queer 
academics and centers around fact that it depicts a self-identified lesbian couple 
‗replicating‘ a heteronormative family structure, the not-so-subtle racism, cartoonish 
depiction of what lesbians ‗look‘ like, as well as its representation of lesbian relationships 
as passionless and sexless.  
Suzanna Walters, critiques the representation of lesbian sexuality and gay kinship 
structures in The Kids Are All Right in ―The kids are all right but the lesbians aren‘t: 
Queer kinship in US culture.‖ She argues that the representation of this lesbian couple is 
essentially heterosexual through its assertion of a generic, ―universal‖ love story (923). 
Walters believes that the universality of this film results in ―a de-gaying of gayness; the 
reliance on heteronormative gender paradigms so that the women are depicted as – really 
– just like our neighbors down the street where daddy goes out to work and mommy stays 
at home; the invisibility of lesbian culture and lesbian friends‖ (926). She goes on to 
argue that while there are some mainstream television shows in which gay families are 
represented to be complex and dynamic, the majority of the representations are still very 
much lacking, especially The Kids Are All Right. Walters goes on to say that ―[a] more 
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prosaic and multilayered queer politics should be part of the context of these familial 
images instead of the sterile world of deracinated lesbian suburbanites we see in The Kids 
Are All Right‖ (930). Ultimately, Walters wants to see mainstream media representations 
of radically different families in ways that disrupt ―heterosexist business as usual and 
provide a template for imagining kinship in the future tense‖ (930). 
While Walters‘ critique is insightful in some aspects, it presupposes that there is a 
‗real‘ gayness and a ‗real‘ heterosexuality which one can achieve; in order to ―de-gay 
gayness,‖ there must first be a cohesive, concrete gayness for which to ―de-gay.‖ She also 
argues that the familial images presented in The Kids Are All Right are of ―…the sterile 
world of deracinated lesbian suburbanites‖; which assumes that deracinated lesbians that 
live in suburbia are somehow less queer than the quintessential queerness or not properly 
queer.   
Gardener also sees the portrayal of this lesbian couple as a negative and 
problematic representation of lesbian parents and queer families. To Gardener, The Kids 
Are All Right falls short of redefining queer families for mainstream (heterosexual) 
audiences and says that: 
 
There already exists an abundance of negative cultural representations of 
lesbians. As such, there is a desperate, political need for positive examples of 
queer families that might work to destabilize current stereotypes about lesbians 
(181). 
 
 
While Gardener‘s analysis is not focused specifically on The Kids Are All Right, 
they use it as an exemplar of the way they see lesbian families portrayed negatively in 
contemporary American society (181). 
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Lisa Duggan‘s scathing review
1
 includes such adjectives as ‗vile‘, ‗horrifying‘, 
‗repulsive‘, and ‗offensive.‘ She cites her revulsion mainly due to the lesbian 
‗caricatures‘ of Nic and Jules. She argues that the gestures, expressions, and movements 
of the two actresses were obviously manufactured in order to make them look ―dykey‖, 
ultimately calling the film a ―dyke-face minstrel show.‖ In regards to the film‘s 
representation of Nic and Jules‘ sex life, Duggan unabashedly declares ―If that‘s what I 
thought I had to look forward to, I‘d exit lesbiana and start sucking dick tomorrow.‖ 
What is problematic about these reviews of The Kids Are All Right is that in 
categorizing this representation of lesbians as ‗negative‘ or ‗bad‘, they are implicitly 
suggesting that in order to count as ‗positive‘, these images must live up to some 
unspoken idea of ‗true‘ queerness or  lesbianism. Films that contain lesbians or queer 
characters are generally gauged on their positivity, meaning their ability to reflect as 
opposed to distort the reality of queer life; but, whose life constitutes the reality? In the 
attempt to cast certain films as negative representations is inherent the act of delimiting 
cinematic desire; ―For one thing, it refuses to allow for the plethora of queer 
identifications made by viewers who look to see their desires reflected in a multiplicity of 
situations, however incongruous or at odds with an established political and social 
identity‖ (Whatling, 85). Just because a film does not accurately reflect a viewer‘s 
politics does not mean that the film itself is bad or that the viewer is remiss in finding 
pleasure in the film.  
                                                          
1
 http://web.archive.org/web/20120315083529/http://bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2010/07/30/only-
the-kids-are-all-right/ 
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As Whatling states, when it comes to films that depict queer and lesbian 
sexualities there is a ―…demand that cinematic images represent the variety of lesbian 
life, that the complexity of lesbian existence can be reflected to the same degree as the 
complexity of heterosexuality is reflected on screen‖ (83). Often in the demands for more 
‗complex‘ lesbian or queer cinematic images, complex seems to mean healthy, happy, 
productive, and stable. Yet, as Dyer reminds us, representations will never be able to 
adequately portray reality, for the images on screen are representations of a particular 
representation of reality—there is no unmediated access to reality (3). So, because people 
make sense of cinematic images in a variety of different ways according to and mediated 
through their life experiences, films like The Kids Are All Right certainly cannot be 
judged as empirically ‗negative‘. 
These reviews all level essentially the same critique: Not Queer Enough.  Nic and 
Jules are too ‗andro dyke‘ and ‗manufactured‘ to represent a ‗real‘ lesbian and their non-
existent sex life also just cannot be representative of the Lesbian Reality. The question of 
whether or not something is ‗queer enough‘ is indeed problematic in itself; to play 
exclusionary politics by judging images according to a standard of queerness in which 
‗real‘ queerness is achieved through a specific outward appearance is not productive. To 
have a queer blueprint in order to determine what and what does not, who and who does 
not fulfill the requirements is counterintuitive to queerness as an idea of constant 
contestation and flux. What are the gestures and movements of a ‗real‘ lesbian and how 
does one ‗look‘ like a lesbian? To deride Bening and Moore for not adequately portraying 
‗real‘ lesbians assumes that there is a particular truth in the way lesbians look and act—
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but where is the cut off and who gets to decide? Calling attention to Nic‘s and Jules‘ lack 
of sex life also assumes that having a healthy sex life with another woman is essential to 
the reality of being a lesbian, which necessarily excludes any other articulation of 
sexuality, including those women who may not find sex pleasurable.
2
 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick says that ―…‗gay‘ and ‗lesbian‘ still present themselves 
(however exclusively) as objective, empirical categories governed by empirical rules of 
evidence (however contested). ‗Queer‘ seems to hinge much more radically and explicitly 
on a person‘s undertaking particular, performative acts of experimental self-perception 
and filiation‖ (9). Sedgwick sees ‗queer‘ as a term that in many important instances, can 
signify only when attached to the first person; that is, only an individual can decided 
whether or not they themselves are definitively queer. While filmic representations 
cannot necessarily speak for themselves in the sense that Sedgwick means, this idea 
nonetheless reminds us to be mindful to not police the boundaries of queerness. It urges 
us to avoid reifying ‗queer‘  into a monolithic category that, like ‗gay‘ and ‗lesbian‘, 
presents itself as objective, empirical category that is governed by rules of evidence. 
The critiques that dismiss this film because it is not queer enough or because it 
does not accurately represent an authentically queer reality rely on the same uncritical, 
totalizing logic as those reviews that elide the aspect of sexuality all together; both 
stances seek to simplify the representation at hand. My project is not to claim this 
representation as queer or as positive—it is simply to push for broader and more complex 
understandings of filmic representations of sexuality. In idealizing certain representations 
                                                          
2
 Gupta, Picturing space for lesbian nonsexualities. 
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as accurately and positively queer, new forms of hierarchy based on exclusion occur; 
therefore, it is necessary to read this film, or any film, in a way that opens up spaces for 
possibility without dictating which kinds of possibilities can and should be realized 
(Butler, viii).  
To argue for a viewer positionality grounded in the idea of ‗queer‘ as resisting any 
coherent categorical definition could seem apolitical. Leo Bersani argues that in the midst 
of the intellectual project of ―denaturalizing the epistemic and political regimes that have 
constructed us,‖ we have in fact only erased ourselves (4). By evoking the term 
‗ourselves‘ Bersani is referring to individuals who identify under the specificities of 
stable gay and lesbian identities which he believes can be used as political rallying points. 
Bersani believes the consequence of highlighting the social constructedness of these 
identity categories is self-erasure. While these identity categories function as political 
rallying points, they ―…tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as the 
normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the rallying points for a liberatory 
contestation of that very oppression‖ (Butler, 354). Meaning, these identities can be used 
for political means, but to what end and for whose politics? Which version of gay and 
lesbian is to be valorized and which versions will be excluded because of it?  
Arguing for a queer reading of film that resists viewing it through any one identity 
category does not erase the specificities of ‗gay‘ or ‗lesbian‘, but creates space for new 
ways to think about sexualities and identities in ―…a complex social ecology where the 
presence of different genders, different identities and identifications, will be taken as a 
given‖ (Sedgwick, xiii). This way of viewing film enables the imagining of new 
 
 
65 
 
possibilities; and while some may not see it as politically valuable, let us keep in mind 
that ―…no political revolution is possible without a radical shift in one‘s notion of the 
possible and the real‖ (Butler, xxiv).    
Because I am advocating this film not be dismissed as wholly negative, neither 
am I saying that it is without flaw. Yes, there are most certainly problematic aspects in 
this film; the treatment and fungibility of people of color, the fact that Nic and Jules are 
not placed within any sort of queer community context, that Nic and Jules are a white, 
upper-middle class lesbian married couple with enough wealth to have two children from 
artificial insemination, and even more wealth so that one of the mothers can stay home 
and raise the children without holding a steady job (in Los Angeles). They are 
unapologetically privileged in almost every aspect. Yet, to dismiss this film based solely 
on the problematic aspects is to completely miss the queer potential it holds. In order for 
a film to be productive, every shot, every line does not have to come together to create a 
gestalt of politically correct perfection. The most valuable way to analyze this film is 
through disidentifying with it by critically interrogating the problematic aspects while 
engaging the queer potentialities.  
While the critical reviews of The Kids Are All Right all offer valid readings and 
make good points about the film, my views are more in line with Jack Halberstam. He 
does believe the film ―…is depressing and sadly trades stale stereotypes about lesbians in 
particular‖
3
 yet, he also notes a particularly interesting quality, ―If I learned anything 
from Cholodenko‘s film, it is that trading in sex for comfort, change for stability, and 
                                                          
3
 http://bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2010/07/15/the-kids-arent-alright/ 
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improvised relationships for marriage are all bad deals and if we don‘t change the social 
structures we inherit, we are doomed to repeat them.‖  
While useful in order to think about the failure to live up to the social structures 
we inherit, Halberstam‘s critique of the film elides an important consideration of failure 
as a political tool—there is a difference between failures that can be chosen and ones that 
cannot. Certain individuals do not have the option of trading in sex for comfort, change 
for stability, and improvised relationships for marriage; and for some people, excitement, 
change, and spontaneity are not feasible ways of living. Yet one of the points Halberstam 
makes here is that the ‗negative‘ depiction of this lesbian family raises the question that 
maybe the individuals in this family are not the cause for its failure; maybe the problem is 
the institution and the idea of family itself. Even a film with problematic aspects can be 
useful inasmuch as it provides an opportunity to critically think through certain issues 
and engage in productive critiques. 
 I do agree that the family structure depicted in this film relies on heteronormative 
patterns of gender and family ideals; which is exactly why I think the ‗failure‘ of this 
family is important. It is important to recognize the ways that ―…heterosexual norms 
reappear within gay identities, to affirm that gay and lesbian identities are not only 
structured in part by dominant heterosexual frame, but that they are not for that reason 
determined by them‖ (Butler, 362). Because Nic and Jules are implicated in 
heterosexuality through their familial structure and gender presentations does not mean 
they are emulating heterosexuality.  It is also important to note that gay identities being 
implicated in heterosexuality is not the same as those identities being derived from 
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heterosexuality, ―…and it is not the same as claiming that that heterosexuality is the only 
cultural network in which they are implicated‖ (Butler, 362). Because Nic and Jules 
imitate a heterosexual familial structure, they are able to resignify ―precisely those 
heterosexual structures that would consign gay life to discursive domains of unreality and 
unthinkability‖ (Butler, 362), and in doing so, expose heterosexuality as an imitation of 
an imitation. When heterosexual constructs appear in gay and lesbian identities, rather 
than being simply mimicry of straightness, they are in fact a commentary on the 
naturalized position of straightness, bringing into relief the constructed status of the 
titular original (Butler, 363). 
There is most certainly a presence of heterosexual norms within not only the 
family structure in The Kids Are All Right, but also within the construction of Nic‘s and 
Jules‘ gender identities. Nic and Jules are raising their nuclear family in suburban Los 
Angeles, where Nic is a successful doctor and Jules is the stay-at-home mom. The more 
masculine mom is the breadwinner, the more feminine one takes care of the home and the 
two kids, a boy and a girl. Even Nic‘s personality represents the heterosexual ideal of 
masculinity: she is rational, strict, serious, focused on work, and cares a lot about the 
presentation of a ‗perfect‘ family. Jules however, is the flighty, indecisive, lax, aging 
hippie mom that always insists on talking about the feelings and emotions of her children 
and partner.  
 The presence of heteronormative constructs in this family, upon first glance, 
makes it seem as though this lesbian couple is simply copying heterosexual family ideals 
and norms. Because of this, one could assume this family‘s failure is due to the fact that 
 
 
68 
 
lesbians are trying to appropriate a heterosexual family structure to fit their ‗alternative‘ 
lifestyle. The reason it is easy to deduce these things about the representation of this 
particular family is, as Butler explains, because ―Compulsory heterosexuality sets itself 
up as the original, the true, the authentic; the norm that determines the real implies that 
―being‖ lesbian is always a kind of miming, a vain effort to participate in the 
phantasmatic plentitude of naturalized heterosexuality which will always and only fail‖ 
(360). 
Heterosexuality, then, posits itself as the normal, the default, the natural sexuality 
and everything that falls outside of heterosexuality is nothing but a copy. Yet, as Butler 
argues, heterosexuality is only an approximation of the ideal of itself; ―…the ―reality‖ of 
heterosexual identities is performatively constituted through an imitation that sets itself 
up as the origin and the ground of all imitations. In other words, heterosexuality is always 
in the process of imitating and approximating its own phantasmatic idealization of 
itself—and failing‖ (361). 
If the reality of heterosexuality is only an approximation of an impossible ideal, 
then when non-heterosexual cultures imitate it, it is always ―…an imitation of an 
imitation, a copy of a copy, for which there is no original‖ (Butler, 362). Therefore, the 
‗appropriation‘ of heterosexual constructs by a non-heterosexual individual—or in this 
case family—serves to expose the fact that heterosexuality is itself nothing more than an 
imitation of itself. The presence of heterosexual constructs within queer identities 
assumes that there is a queer imitation or repetition of straightness that only serves to 
highlight the constructedness of the ‗original‘:  
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That parodic replication and resignification of heterosexual constructs within 
non-heterosexual frames brings into relief the utterly constructed status of the so-
called original, but it shows that heterosexuality only constitutes itself as the 
original through a convincing act of repetition. (Butler, 362) 
 
 
 It is possible to read the film in a way that shows when Nic‘s and Jules‘ attempt to 
‗imitate‘ heterosexual familial constructs, through their failure, they expose the 
heterosexual idea of ‗family‘ itself as an approximation of an ideal that can never be 
achieved. Ultimately, everyone‘s gender and sexuality, as well as the norms and 
constructs that follow, are fabricated and contingent and must be constantly repeated 
because they never quite accomplish the ideal.   By keeping in mind the constructedness 
of gender, sexuality, and social norms, this reading of The Kids Are All Right offers an 
alternative to previous readings that find it an inauthentic representation of lesbian or 
queer sexuality. In acknowledging that there is no ‗real‘ queerness which this film is 
attempting to approximate, the insights into the film can be productive beyond ‗queer 
enough‘ critiques.  
Because Nic and Jules fail in their approximation of heterosexual family ideals, 
we must ask, why?  Maybe the failure here is not of lesbians trying to appropriate 
heteronormative family structures; maybe it‘s the failure of all families, the institution of 
family. If no one can live up to the ideal of family regardless of their sexual identity, 
maybe the current notion of ―family‖ has run its course. Maybe rather than blame the 
members of the family for failing or talk about the trials that all families experience or the 
problems that come along with long-term committed relationships we need to reconceive 
of what a family means and what it entails. Perhaps the moral of the story is that family 
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and long-term monogamous relationships function as a cage, smothering one‘s passion 
and future. While this film is certainly very problematic in many respects, through the 
failure of the family, we are forced to think what constitutes a ‗real‘ family and able to 
think of other possible family configurations that could have potentially worked. The film 
itself does not suggest these avenues to alternative family constructions; but, through 
disidentification, the queer spectator is able to imagine different configurations.  
Perhaps, if it weren‘t for the illicit affair between Jules and Paul, this family could 
have been reconfigured as existing with a donor dad and two moms, all being fully 
involved in the children‘s lives. Or perhaps, illicit affair included, if Nic reacted 
differently, could this not have worked with the donor dad being in a sexual relationship 
with the moms? These are hypothetical situations, and while the film does not present 
these options, a queer spectator can read into certain queer moments throughout the film 
that allow for imagining of alternative structures of relationships and families. 
 Alexander Doty uses the term ‗queer moment‘ to name  those instances in all 
texts, even in heterocentrist texts, that ―describe a wide range of impulses and cultural 
expressions, including space for describing and expressing bisexual, transsexual, and 
straight queerness‖ (2). A queer moment is an instance in a text that can ―… be described 
as moments of narrative disruption which destabilize heteronormativity, and the 
meanings and identities it engenders, by bringing to light all that is disavowed by, and yet 
integral to, heteronormative logic‖ (Sullivan, 191). Queer moments are the spaces where 
disidentification can be actualized; they can be thought of as those elements in a text, 
those fleeting occurrences where the spectator catches a glimpse of something queer 
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which allows them to articulate their own histories, presents, and futures in that text. It 
allows them to read themselves into that moment, even if the text itself does not offer this 
reading as an option. It‘s a way of thinking beyond what is presented to us in the film text 
and allow the viewer to construct their own narrative future. Reading the film this way, 
by highlighting and analyzing these queer moments, the possibilities of the film are 
expanded rather than constricted. 
One of the queerest moments in the film is when Nic and Jules are attempting to 
have sex while they‘re watching gay male porn. This sex scene leaves much to be 
desired; it‘s not sexy in the slightest, there‘s no passion, only vague boredom, and the 
scene ends in a slapstick comedy-esque performance of the two scrambling for the 
remote control in order to turn the volume down. While the scene is most definitely 
lacking in sex appeal, it also does something interesting; it shows two lesbians having sex 
to gay male porn, which is presumably a typical event for the two of them.  
This interesting detail of Nic and Jules‘ relationship continues later in the film 
when Laser and his friend Clay are snooping around in Nic and Jules‘ bedroom and they 
find a DVD hidden in a drawer. Clay immediately assumes that it‘s porn, and the 
assumption is that since the Moms are lesbian, they would only take pleasure in 
pornography that featured lesbians. Clay is beyond excited and tells Laser that they‘re 
watching it. Laser, although hesitant, capitulates and follows Clay to watch the DVD. 
The next scene shows Laser and Clay sitting in front of a computer watching the DVD, 
which, to the boys‘ dismay,  is gay male porn. The computer shows an image of a 
shirtless male with a police helmet on, playing with his nipples and dancing to a cheesy, 
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quintessential 1970s porn soundtrack. Laser and Clay are completely confused: ―Do you 
think the whole thing‘s like this…Maybe we should fast forward.‖ They are confused by 
the fact that two lesbians would have a pornography DVD depicting anything other than 
lesbian sex; because, of course, self-identified lesbians cannot be sexually attracted or 
aroused by anything besides other lesbians.  
Next, we see Jules pull up to the house. She walks into Laser‘s room only to find 
Clay and him watching gay male porn; they‘re still confused and now so is Jules. In the 
following scene, Jules and Nic sit Laser down for a ―talk.‖ Laser thinks this talk is about 
punishment for going through Jules and Nic‘s room, while Nic and Jules have initiated 
the talk because they have an inclination that Laser may be gay. Jules asks Laser if there 
is anything he wants to tell them, and he says no, but he does have a question. Nic and 
Jules think, of course, the question is going to be something about Laser being sexually 
attracted to Clay. It turns out he asks them, ―Why do you guys watch gay man porn?‖ 
They obviously were not expecting this to be the question; but, Jules decides to field it 
anyway. Her response is ―Well, sweetie, you know, human sexuality is complicated. And 
sometimes desire can be, you know, counterintuitive. You know, for example, because 
women‘s sexual responsiveness is internalized, sometimes it‘s exciting for us to see 
responsiveness externalized, like with a…Like with a penis.‖ Laser asks why they do not 
prefer to watch ―girls doing it‖ and Jules answers that in ‗lesbian‘ pornography they 
usually hire straight women to pretend and ―the inauthenticity is just unbearable.‖  
The first queer element here would be the fact that two straight-identifying boys 
are watching gay male porn—while it‘s arguable that they took pleasure in it, they must 
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have taken a certain amount of pleasure in watching it or they would not have sat there 
and watched as long as they did. Most importantly though, is the fact that two self-
identifying lesbians choose to watch gay male porn. I‘m not sure of the validity of the 
film‘s pop-pseudo-psychoanalytic explanation of the reason why they watch gay male 
porn, because if anything, desire is by definition intuitive; but, the film does show some 
subversive qualities in this respect. 
  Rather than delineate the boundaries of what is and is not a lesbian, this film 
expands them; it offers up a self-identified lesbian who is aroused by gay male porn, has 
a sexual relationship with a man, and in the end (or, all along) is still a lesbian. The film 
is being self-referential when Jules says that human sexuality is complicated—the film 
proceeds to show certain ways in which human sexuality is not a static category. The 
Kids Are All Right shows an individual whose sexuality‘s qualifiers seemingly prohibit 
pleasure from sex with the opposite gender, as well as pleasure from watching two men 
have sex—in order to ―be‖ a ―real‖ lesbian, presumably one should only have interest in 
the same gender. Rather than policing the borders of lesbianism, The Kids Are All Right 
works to expand them by asking the question, what constitutes a lesbian? 
In questioning what acts constitute an authentic lesbian, The Kids Are All Right 
presents a sexual identity that is uncoupled from an individual‘s sexual practices. 
Lesbianism is often taken to be characterized by sexual practices that are oriented toward 
a single partner of the same gender and that this identity will not change over time 
(Sedgwick, 8). The film challenges this assumption by presenting the viewer with a self-
identified lesbian who does not, at least within the confines of the filmic text, have sex 
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with her same-gender wife, yet who does have sex  with the opposite gender several 
times, and finds it pleasurable. We are able to imagine what a lesbian identity looks like 
that does not place same-gender sex at its center, which certainly is a reminder of the 
provisionality, contingency, and instability of identity categories.  
 Jules is ―still‖ a lesbian even after she has sex with a man, and she has, 
throughout the course of the film, understood herself as a lesbian. After her affair with 
Paul comes out, Nic asks her, ―Are you straight now?‖ Emphatically, Jules responds, 
―No. It has nothing to do with that!‖ When Jules has a phone conversation with Paul 
about the affair not being a secret anymore, Paul suggests that he and Jules continue the 
relationship and become a couple. Jules thinks his idea is ludicrous, leaving Nic and 
starting a relationship with Paul was never in her plans. While Paul continues to babble 
on about how they can be together, she‘s had enough of trying to talk over him and 
finally shouts ―I‘m gay!‖  
Jules never thinks of herself as anything other than a lesbian the entire time she‘s 
having an affair with Paul; the second time Jules and Paul have sex, she asks him 
afterward, ―God. Do you think I‘m some sad-sack, middle-aged lesbian?‖ The fact that 
Jules still self-identifies as a lesbian even as she‘s lying in bed naked beside a man with 
whom she‘s just had sex is extremely important. Jules does not have to explain to Laser, 
or the audience, the complexities of human sexuality; she shows us throughout the course 
of the film. The film never questions Jules‘ sexuality or sexual orientation—it is a given 
fact that she is a lesbian, even though she has sex with a man. The film never portrays 
Jules‘ extra-marital affair as an internal conflict about her sexual identity and because it 
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does not work to place the viewer in a position of judgment, it works against policing the 
boundaries of who counts as a lesbian. The film raises the question that maybe sexual 
orientation is not all about who you have sex with. Rather than seeing this aspect of The 
Kids Are All Right as a negative portrayal of lesbian sexuality, the audience can 
disidentify with it in order to expand the horizons of what can be considered ‗lesbian‘; 
―Disidentification is about expanding and problematizing identity and identification, not 
abandoning any socially prescribed identity component‖ (Munoz, 29).  
Not only does the film work to push the boundaries of who can be considered a 
lesbian, it also can be read as pushing the boundaries of what constitutes a family. It‘s 
entirely possible that the family could have entered into a co-parenting agreement and 
formed a three-parent family. I do not think the film intentionally offers these brief looks 
into an alternative family structure because it poses as a universal love story about all 
families, i.e. families constructed under the auspices of Western ideas of love and 
marriage. While the film implicitly shuts down the option of a three-parent family, there 
are instances in the film where the audience is able to see it as a viable familial structure. 
The first instance is the scene in which Nic and Jules meet Paul for the first time. 
Paul comes over for a casual, cook-out style lunch at Nic‘s and Jule‘s house. Nic, Jules, 
Laser, Joni, and Paul all gather around the picnic table outside, eating food and drinking 
wine, having lighthearted conversation. Nic asks questions about Paul and his life, 
attempting to get know him a little better and Paul reciprocates, asking questions about 
Jules does for a living and how the two of them met. The conversation being had is 
nothing too important, and while the whole event is a little awkward, nothing is out of the 
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ordinary. In this representation of a quotidian lunch, with unremarkable conversation, the 
audience is able to see these two separate entities of ‗donor dad‘ and ‗family‘ become 
one. In this queer moment, the audience has the potential to read this as a particular 
construction of family. 
The idea of this cohesive family unit presents itself again later in the film when 
Nic, Jules, and the kids go over to Paul‘s house for dinner. Jules, Laser, and Joni are all in 
the kitchen helping Paul prepare the meal for the evening while Nic sits on the couch 
going through Paul‘s record collection. Next, they are all gathered around the dinner table 
eating and having conversation. While this dinner is much more familiar and comfortable 
than the first meeting, it is still excruciatingly awkward at some points; but, then again, 
when is family not awkward at some points? Nic and Paul find that they have a musical 
commonality: both love Joni Mitchell. Upon this realization, Paul gives Nic a high five 
and exclaims ―My brother from another mother!‖; then they begin singing an a cappella  
rendition of Joni Mitchell‘s ―All I Want‖. While very awkward, it shows the 
comfortability, casualness, and ease of the family; we can really imagine that this is a 
normal occurrence, we can see this family as a three-parent household. As the scene 
comes to a close, Paul holds up his wine class to cheers ―To an unconventional family.‖ 
While this dinner scene does not intentionally serve the purpose of depicting an 
alternative family structure, the audience can certainly read it that way. This scene in fact 
serves as the reason Nic finds out about Jules‘ affair with Paul—it‘s the scene that marks 
the beginning of what could be a family, but ultimately fails because of infidelity.  
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What is important though, is that while the narrative of the film did not allow a 
three-parent familial structure to succeed, the audience saw glimpses of it succeeding. 
The audience, however briefly, is able to set aside expectations about love, marriage, 
parenthood, and kinship drawn from prevailing Western theories about family and 
intimacy and imagine another construction of family (Stacey, 8). Perhaps the reason this 
family failed is because it was wholly bound up in the American nuclear, 
heteronormative idea of family, ―…one spawned when reciprocal romantic love inspires 
one man and one woman to exchange vows to forsake all others before they begin 
inviting visits from the stork‖ (Stacey, 5). 
While the failure of this family and the difficulties Nic and Jules experience in 
their relationship echo familiar obstacles in heterosexual relationships, ―…the gender 
difference (or similarity) of the usual suspects helps to illuminate, and sometimes to 
challenge, many otherwise clichéd conventions of gender and sexual practice‖ (Stacey, 
29). That is, when two women attempt heterosexual marriage conventions and fail, it 
illuminates not the failure of the women, but the failure of the institution. Rather than 
adhering to the Western ideals of family strictly emanating from two people who are in 
mutual romantic love, maybe ‗family‘ and ‗marriage‘ should be reconfigured with  ―….a 
mature willingness to acknowledge the variety, complexity, fluidity, and sheer mystery of 
individual sexual longings, limits, aesthetics, and meanings‖ (Stacey, 47). Rather than 
unapologetically promoting monogamy for all and demonizing those who slip, we might 
instead redefine fidelity to ―…signify faithfulness to the particular sexual, emotional, and 
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social commitments that intimates mutually arrive at through honest negotiation and 
renegotiation‖ (Stacey, 47).  
 The point is that there is no normal family; there‘s no right or wrong way to be a 
family. The only problematic way to be a family is through trying to live up to 
heteronormative ideals of what a family means or should look like when those ideals 
themselves are broken; ―In fact, a family system that insists on hitching eros and 
domesticity through monogamous marriage is a recipe not for stability but for high rates 
of adultery and divorce…‖ (Stacey, 189). We see that they‘re broken through Nic and 
Jules‘ failed approximation of these ideals and we also see glimpses of a reconfigured 
family involving Jules, Nic, and Paul. By seeing two same-gender people perform the 
daily tasks and obstacles of marriage and family, it makes glaringly obvious the 
constructs they are trying to play out. When it‘s a man and a woman having marriage 
problems in a film, you don‘t ever really see that it‘s the problem of the structure of 
marriage, you just see it‘s the problem of one of the people in the marriage—the 
workings of family and marriage are hidden by the familiarity of those structures. When 
you see two people ‗pretending‘ to follow the form and structure of heterosexual family 
but they‘re not heterosexual, their performance is at once familiar and  unfamiliar, it 
becomes obvious that the whole thing is a social construction—that heterosexuals are 
trying to approximate impossible ideals, and they are failing too. It‘s not the people 
inhabiting the structure, it‘s the structure.  
 In order for images to be read in terms of the queer moments and potentialities 
they offer, the images themselves do not necessarily have to be self-referential in their 
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queerness. Through disidentification, the viewer is able to critically interrogate and 
rework the problematic aspects of The Kids Are All Right while simultaneously locating 
and enacting productive queer potentialities; and in doing so, are at once able to offer a 
critique and envision new ways of being.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
QUEER FUTURES: IMPLICATIONS OF CINEMA 
 
 
Films reflect ideas, notions, and feelings of the society in which we live. They 
make available concepts and ideas that contribute to the ways in which we understand 
and experience the world. Because films have the ability to structure the way we see the 
world, subjects are created in part through their engagements with cinematic texts. Films 
offer spaces that enable subjects to articulate their desires, fashion themselves, and 
ultimately see possibilities that they never thought possible. 
 However, critiques are often leveled at mainstream cinema, purporting that the 
images presented are usually damaging, negative, and limiting for gay, lesbian, and queer 
spectators. One of the most well-known of these critiques is Vito Russo’s Celluloid 
Closet, in which Russo presents us with depictions of gays and lesbians throughout 
cinematic history and shows us, The Gays, just how damaging and hurtful these images 
about us are to us. What do critiques like this really do? What do these critiques say 
about queer spectators who have articulated their worlds and fashioned themselves 
through engagement with cinematic Hollywood texts that are derided as ‘negative?’ Brett 
Farmer asks us to consider what this says about lesbians, gays, and queers “…who have 
not only had Hollywood cinema ‘touch their lives’ but have made it an integral, even 
foundational, component of those lives, and whose most intense and pleasurable 
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experiences have often been provided by the very films that this critical work seeks so 
vehemently to condemn?” (4-5). 
The images, sounds, and narratives of the cinema do not simply reveal desire in a 
sort of representational mimesis, they teach us how to desire, they interpellate us into 
discourses of sexuality and provide us with the language to speak and hear ourselves 
(Farmer, 19). And, if all popular Hollywood cinematic images are inherently negative 
and damaging to queer people, how in the world have we come to exist? If the images of 
cinema do not allow for queer identification and deny the tools for self-fashioning and 
self-articulation, how does one explain queer spectators? Honestly, since when has a film 
being a categorized as a “negative depiction” of queers ever stopped a queer from using it 
as a site to mobilize desires, fantasies and meanings  (Farmer, 19)?  
Throughout this project, I have attempted to employ the word „queer‟ to refer to 
open-endedness and inclusivity of various possibilities. I do not see „queer‟ to be, in any 
way, a limiting word. Though, arguing for a spectatorial positionality that attempts to 
deny being pegged down does make it somewhat tricky to theorize from that specific 
point and can lend itself to the criticism of being apolitical. It seems if there is to be any 
productive theorizing or political work, it must be organized around a particular identity; 
and as Butler states, “[t]hat any consolidation of identity requires some set of 
differentiations and exclusions seems clear” (359). Yet, the times in this project where I 
do deploy queer to refer to a congealed identity, I mean it in a way that does not close 
down future uses of that sign, does not limit and exclude what is now and what can or 
will be possible. In recognizing the temporal contingency of „queer‟, it becomes a site of 
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contest and revision that has the ability to “…take on a future set of significations that 
those of us who use it now may not be able to foresee” (Butler, 359). 
 For this reason, I argue against the reviews and critiques of films that tout a 
„queerer than thou‟ attitude; for these responses to films, or culture in general, that judge 
or deny certain articulations of queerness “…based on politics, style, sexual behavior, or 
any other quality, can only make queerness become something other than an open and 
flexible space” (Doty, xv). When queer is invoked within this project, it attempts to 
account for a vast range of expressions and positions in culture that just don‟t line up 
appropriately; queer here recognizes that it is possible for various and fluctuating queer 
positionalities to be occupied whenever any person responds to culture (Doty, 3).  
Some may argue that my invocation of the word queer in this project is not clear, 
it‟s ambiguous, it‟s confusing, it‟s often contradictory—which is exactly the way it 
should be. Queerness here, in this project, is used to describe any identification, 
disidentification, or expression that can be marked as anti-straight, contra-straight, or 
non-straight (Doty, xv). A spectator does not have to be queer to have a queer 
identification and a queer does not have to watch films with queers in them in order to 
identify. In my view, a straight woman‟s response to the sex scene between Mila Kunis 
and Natalie Portman in Black Swan is just as queer as the response of a self-identified 
lesbian spectator. Also, I think the use of queer also allows for articulations of desire and 
identity that do not rely solely upon sexual object choice or gender; queer can refer to 
matrices of desire that crisscross and intersect at race, class, ability, ethnicity, etc. 
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Ultimately my conception of queer and its usage throughout this project is one of 
openness and possibility.  
Cinema is an important arena for the production of queer desires and meanings. 
The cinema offers information and ideas about ourselves and allows for an alternative 
horizon of experience where we can access meaning and pleasure that‟s not readily 
available elsewhere (Farmer, 19). We must not view films and what happens to the 
aesthetically mediated characters within them as the equivalent of what happens to „real‟ 
people; but, through film, we are able to see that in the “…affective scenarios of these 
works and discourses we can discern claims about the situation of our contemporary life” 
(Berlant, 13).  Just because a certain film does not claim itself to be about queers, 
certainly does not mean that queers cannot finding the film itself useful, nor do the 
images depicted have to be „universally positive‟ for queers in order to identify with 
them. As Whatling states,  
 
…identification and desire need not be limited to certain film texts or characters 
designated „positively lesbian‟ but is rather multiple and contradictory. It can 
colonize films with no obvious lesbian credentials and appropriate them to its 
own agenda. It can embrace good characters and bad characters where such 
distinctions no longer hold a self-evident meaning… (Whatling, 164) 
 
When thinking about films that had a huge impact on my self-formation when I was 
growing up, I recall that none of them had overt queer or lesbian imagery in them. None 
of them were explicitly about lesbians, in fact, many of them were very explicitly about 
heterosexuality. If mainstream Hollywood films are supposed to function to interpellate 
you and indoctrinate you into being a heterosexual, I never felt that way.   
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Many of the films I loved and watched repeatedly while I was growing up were 
(heterosexual) romance films; but, in watching them, I never felt like they were damaging 
to me, I never felt like they were denying me any identificatory outlets because I always 
disidentified. I always loved these films, and yet I always knew that I did not watch them 
the same way as other people did. I read myself into the moments where I did not fit; I 
saw myself there or reworked it so it made sense to me. I was not interpellated by these 
films in the way that I was intended to be. When I watched Dirty Dancing (1987), I never 
wanted to be Baby (Jennifer Grey) falling in love with Johnny (Patrick Swayze), or I 
never wanted to be Sandy (Olivia Newton John) when she finally gets Danny (John 
Travolta) (Grease, 1978). At the same time though, that does not necessarily mean I 
wanted to be Johnny or Danny as they got the girl; rather, I was able to imagine a world 
where (however problematic this may be) the narrative was the same, but I got the girl or 
the girl got me. 
 For queers, it‟s all about catching these little glimpses in films and investing 
emotions in them that don‟t necessarily correspond with the film‟s intentions. For 
instance, in Dirty Dancing there was always one particular scene that I always felt 
strangely drawn to. During the montage (set to “Hungry Eyes”) of Johnny teaching Baby 
the dance so she can take Penny‟s (Cynthia Rhodes) place in the show, there is one scene 
where Penny and Baby are dancing together. It‟s not really a lesbian scene, they only 
touch hands, they don‟t kiss, they don‟t really show any expressions of sexual attraction; 
yet, I always felt a strong affinity for this part. Maybe because, however briefly, even if it 
the film didn‟t intentionally do so, I was able to see two beautiful women dancing 
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together and this meant something to me. Whatling says, “For the viewer…it does not 
ultimately matter whether the lesbian on screen gets the girl or not, what matters is that 
we, the audience, think that we might if we just look long enough. In appropriating these 
moments, regardless of their diegetic recuperation to heterosexuality, they operate as 
stolen moments, all the more tantalizing for their unlicensed nature” (110).  
Just because these particular films depict „heterosexuality,‟ as Whatling reminds 
us  no film text belongs to any one constituency; “It seems as foolish to argue that any 
text is intrinsically lesbian as to argue that a text is exclusively heterosexual….we 
nevertheless live in a viewing world where we still have the chance to call everything our 
own” (3). Meaning, in the filmic world, we can call anything ours, we can see ourselves 
in anything, regardless of the supposed sexuality it represents. Watching films, then, is 
ultimately a transformative process in which the audience has the ability to alter the focus 
of meaning of a film text and read into the narrative what they most long to see 
(Whatling, 2). 
This act of disidentification was never (and often times, still isn‟t) a conscious 
process, it just happened. As Munoz reminds us, disidentification is a vital function and a 
means of survival for queers; it becomes habitual, like breathing or blinking. You don‟t 
think about it, you just do it to live. Here in order to articulate the vast importance of 
disidentification in the formation of queer subjectivities, I find it helpful to quote Jose 
Munoz at length: 
 
These practices of survival are, of course, not anything like intrinsic attributes 
that a subject is born with. More nearly, these practices are learned. They are not 
figured out alone, they are informed by the examples of others. These 
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identifications with others are often mediated by a complicated network of 
incomplete, mediated, or crossed identifications. They are also forged by the 
pressures of everyday life, forces that shape a subject and call for different 
tactical responses. It is crucial that such children are able to look past „self‟ and 
encounter others who have managed to prosper in such spaces. Sometimes a 
subject needs something to identify with; sometimes a subject needs heroes to 
mimic and to invest all sorts of energies in. (38)  
 
 
The practices of disidentification are learned through the examples of others, through a 
network of incomplete, mediated, or crossed identifications; it occurs in those spaces 
where things just don‟t seem to line up the way that they should, and that is okay. 
Sedgwick believes that for many queers, the childhood ability “…to attach intently to a 
few cultural objects, of high or popular culture or both, objects whose meaning seemed 
mysterious, excessive, or oblique in relations to the codes most readily available to us, 
became a prime resource for survival” (3). And it is in these spaces where meaning does 
not line up tidily that we invest with energy and fascination. It is okay to identify, or 
disidentify with an image that does not, or should not, line up with your identity; it is in 
these spaces of dissonance where queerness is most productive.  
To argue that films must contain positive representations of queers in order for 
queer spectators to derive cinematic pleasure or usefulness from them is too simplistic. It 
is, for one thing, to assume that in order to experience pleasure in a film, queers must 
have a coherent sense of identity from which they can articulate what counts as positive. 
Queer people conceive of themselves in often contradictory ways and identities are 
subjectively articulated, provisional, contingent, and shifting. As Jonathan Keane argues 
 
…excluded identities such as gays, blacks, and lesbians…do not often live in an 
Imaginary realm of coherence but are more likely to be only too painfully aware 
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of identity as incoherence…those marginalized by cultural hegemony find it 
almost impossible to experience identity as self-presence, as they are constantly 
positioned by the culture as its negative element while they are simultaneously 
constructed through other discourses to aim for mastery and positivity.” (Cited in 
Farmer, 7) 
 
Meaning, there is never a stable subjectivity reached where one can articulate absolutely 
what is positive, what is not, and what images queers can use to articulate themselves and 
their desires.  
 Perhaps this constant awareness of identity as incoherence allows queers to be 
adept and avoid experiencing film through only one facet of subjectivity. We are all 
articulated in various discourses in various ways at various levels; identity is never a 
unified stable sign, it‟s a complicated field of subjective articulation that is provisional 
and shifting.  Because of this, one cannot argue that any image is negative for gays, or 
wholly negative at all for that matter. As Whatling argues, it is the instability of the film 
texts which offer neither a wholly positive image of lesbianism nor a coherent account of 
heterosexuality that renders them so pleasurable, so interesting, and ultimately so 
appropriable to individual spectorial desire (110).   
 Not only does disidentification function as a way for queers to view cinematic 
representations, it is also used by the critic as a hermeneutical process of “…decoding 
mass, high, or any other cultural field from the perspective of a minority subject who is 
disempowered in such a representational hierarchy” (Munoz, 25). I have attempted to 
argue in this study that through disidentification, queer subjects can use cinema as a tool 
for self-fashioning while simultaneously recognizing and understanding the negative 
aspects of these particular films. Rather than ignore the problematic aspects, through 
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disidentification, queer subjects are able to rework those sites and critically interrogate 
why and how it is negative, and what needs to be done. Disidentification is not just the 
uncritical dismissal of cinematic images, either; it is to find usefulness in the image, those 
spaces in the representation that offers the spectator a new way of imagining alternate 
worlds and ways of being. In deconstructing these films through a queer viewpoint, I 
have hopefully shown that, often times, failure and ambiguity are the most productive 
sites for disidentification and worldmaking to take place. The concept of worldmaking 
characterizes the ways in which certain performances, both theatrical and quotidian, have 
the ability to alter the present, create a future, and map out alternative views of the world 
(Munoz, 195). Whatling reminds us that “… as readers of popular culture, we have to be 
as aware of declaring texts monolithically oppressive as we do of declaring their various 
misreadings as intrinsically radical…”(89). 
The totalizing critiques that dismiss particular cinematic representations as 
negative miss many things; they miss the opportunity to productively critique the text in a 
way that does not just say “This image is bad because…”, but instead contextualizes this 
cinematic representation and interrogates social or historical reasons why this image 
exists and to what network of discursive elements it speaks. No film or cultural text exists 
in a vacuum, they do not speak for themselves and they are made to speak to a network of 
different discursive devices. Through critical analysis of filmic texts, we are not only able 
to see what they say, but how and from what place it can be said; that is, how and in what 
ways is the symbolic space structured where this film event takes places. Interrogating 
films in this way opens up many spaces that are more productive than just dismissing a 
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film as „negative‟ or „positive‟; it allows us ask why is it negative, in what ways, what are 
the social structures in place that allow such an image to be depicted? 
Rather than saying that the representation of Nina and her expression of sexuality 
is negative, it forces us to ask, why could it be perceived this way? In what ways does the 
film show us a negative image? Does the negativity stem from the implicit correlation 
between expression of female sexuality and insanity? If it is, then through 
disidentification, we can interrogate the background of discursively pre-constituted space 
in which this film is received. We can ask what mechanisms in the “real world” function 
in a way that renders female sexuality as deviant, how is the symbolic space structured so 
that female sexuality linked to insanity is a culturally intelligible correlation? Instead of 
saying that Nic and Jules are not queer enough because they mimic too closely the 
heteronormative familial structure that queers should have an inherent aversion to, it 
allows us to question why we think this. In what ways is this representation of familial 
structure harmful to queers and what are the possibilities for its restructuring in a way 
that does not replace „family‟ with another oppressive institution?  
The pervasive demand for images that represent queers in a „positive‟ light serves 
neoliberal projects of regulation very well. Often, „positive‟ representations of queers are 
only those who show them as being self-sufficient, mentally and emotionally stable, 
monogamous, productive citizens of society; the „negative‟ representations of queers are 
often ones where they are promiscuous, trauma-ridden, and unstable. The „positive‟ 
representation of queers sounds a lot like the ideal neoliberal subject; Lisa Duggan has 
coined this notion as “the new homonormativity.” The new homonormativity is a politics 
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that does not oppose the dominant heteronormative society, institutions or discourses, 
“…but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay 
constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and 
consumption” (Duggan, 50).  Thus, the „positive‟ image of queers only comes to mean 
those queers who want to marry, who want to serve in the military, who want to be 
domestic, and who want to consume; a „positive‟ queer is „just like everyone else.‟ These 
images show good queers to be docile, passive, and of little threat to the heteronormative 
hegemony. The proliferation of images like these, ones that purport to represent „positive‟ 
queer citizens, buttress the political rhetoric of homonormativity, where  
 
…„equality‟ becomes narrow, formal access to a few conservatizing institutions, 
„freedom‟ becomes impunity for bigotry and vast inequalities in commercial life 
and civil society, the „right to privacy‟ becomes domestic confinement, and 
democratic politics itself becomes something to be escaped. (Duggan, 66) 
 
 
  On the other hand, many of the reviews discussed in regard to the two present 
films, Black Swan, and especially The Kids Are All Right , seem to point to the notion that 
these films are not „positive‟ because they are, in fact, not queer enough. This figuration 
of „positivity‟ is (somewhat) different from the neoliberal call for positive images; yet, 
they both serve the same regulatory purpose. In this sense, policing the boundaries of 
what counts as queer places limits on queer expression and self-actualization; in a strange 
turn of homophobic rhetoric, it becomes “you can‟t self-articulate in this way because it 
doesn‟t represent real queer values” [insert Christian, conservative, family, etc. for 
„queer‟]. I‟m sure that these „queer‟ regulatory projects have the intentions of being for 
some sort of noble cause that weeds out all the „fake queers‟; but, when queers get in the 
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business of regulating themselves, what chance do we have? As Doty reminds us, “After 
all, in any of its uses so far, queerness has been set up to challenge and break apart 
conventional categories, not become one itself” (xv).  
We cannot continue participating in the creation of identity categories and 
vigilantly policing those boundaries; the only option is disidentification and failure. 
Perhaps we should attempt to fail at identity rather than conform.
1
 It is more important 
now than ever to actively resist one particular strand of gay rights whose core values are 
full access to marriage and military service at the expense of others who still would not 
have access if these rights were granted. We should not be advocating for the normalizing 
state regulation of queer sex, sexuality, and reproduction through the laws of marriage 
without regard to the implications this holds for issues of race, class, gender, sex, 
religion, ethnicity, and nationality (Duggan, xvi). Yet, at the same time, it is imperative to 
avoid the reification of queer as a stable identity category. To make the assertion that 
there is a representation that gets at the „realness‟ or „authenticity‟ of queer life is to 
assume that there is an authentic queerness to find. What is queer enough exactly? I, for 
one, am not sure that there is such a thing; for, as Sedgwick tells us, „queer‟ resonates 
most when attached to the first person.  
I believe that the critical analysis of film is very important cultural work that goes 
far beyond “just watching movies.” I often feel that I must defend my chosen academic 
pursuits by constantly justifying that what I do is important in ways that may not match 
up to certain standards of success. Yet, discursive analysis does have “real” and 
                                                          
1
 Of course, I acknowledge that this is not a viable option for everyone. Some people must assimilate into 
particular identity categories in order to survive.  
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important effects. It is necessary to critically analyze the ways in which films function as 
cultural artifacts that have an impact on aspects of everyday life and position them within 
the existing social, cultural, and institutional structures of power (Giroux, 3). Films, 
whether we realize it or not, have an enormous impact on the way we speak, the way we 
think, dress, act, and even our collective cultural memory. Situating films in broader 
discourses allows for the exploration of how films function as representational systems 
that are implicated in identity formation (Giroux, 13). Films have the ability to raise 
questions about the broader social landscape and in doing so, they are able to create 
spaces which expand the possibilities for critiques of these larger set of ideas, discourses, 
and institutions (Giroux, 7).  
While I am arguing against the idea of any particular film being  wholly „positive‟ 
or wholly „negative, I do find it important to mention that I am certainly not advocating 
that Black Swan and The Kids Are All Right are without flaw; because they certainly are. 
The glaring issue in both of these films is the utter lack of characters of color; Black 
Swan has literally no character of color in the film whatsoever, and The Kids Are All 
Right has only three. As if the sheer lack of representation of people of color in The Kids 
Are All Right wasn‟t enough, all three characters of color are depicted in a stereotypical 
manner and are treated as expendable by the central characters. The hostess at Paul‟s 
restaurant is a Black woman with natural hair makes who sexual advances toward Paul 
often; she is cast off by Paul as not being worthy of commitment. The Latino gardener 
that helps Jules is fired under the false premise that he „has a drug problem‟ when in 
reality he keeps sniffling because he is allergic to pollen. Joni has a best friend who is a 
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young man of color, she makes out with him at a party because she‟s upset about family 
issues; we never see him again the rest of the film. These situations are supposed to serve 
as moments of comedy, in the case of the gardener, or as simple situations that only move 
forward the story of the white characters in the film—the characters of color are fungible. 
This is highly problematic; but, at the same time, I assert that it is possible to disidentify 
from this issue in these films and still be able to find the productive possibilities in them. 
I certainly do not wish to trivialize race (or lack of) in these films, but it is important to 
not entirely dismiss these two films because they are overwhelmingly whitewashed.  
Through disidentificatory readings of film, we are able to “…resist the social 
matrix of dominant publicity by exposing the rhetorical/ideological context of state 
power…Disidentification permits the subject of ideology to contest the interpellations of 
the dominant ideology” (168). While there is no “outside” of ideology, disidentification 
allows us to recognize the problematic aspects of ideology and resist them, restructuring 
them in a way that allows for new possibilities. 
Disidentification has tangible capabilities as well; it isn‟t only a way to read films. 
Disidentification is able to make worlds, worlds with transformative politics and 
possibilities. Jose Munoz labels this product of disidentification as „worldmaking‟ in that 
is has the ability to establish alternate views of the world; “These alternative vistas are 
more than simply views or perspectives; they are oppositional ideologies that function as 
critiques of oppressive regimes of „truth‟ that subjugate minoritarian people” (195). 
While of course in regard to film, this worldmaking through disidentification is only in 
fantasy; but, we must remember that film fantasy also creates subjects, and this fantasy is 
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articulated in real subjectivities through race, class, gender, and sexuality.  Munoz goes 
on to assert that counterpublics are enabled by visions, or worldviews, that 
simultaneously reshape and deconstruct reality (196).  
Counterpublics are the name that Munoz gives to the different groupings that fall 
outside of the majoritarian public. These subaltern groupings are often comprised of 
those whose designated genders, desires, or ethnic identities do not seem to fit into the 
majoritarian public sphere. The spaces created by and through disidentification are where 
these counterpublics can come into being: “Counterpublics are not magically and 
automatically realized through disidentifications, but they are suggested, rehearsed, and 
articulated” (Munoz, 179). Munoz conceives of counterpublics as spaces that are in 
opposition to other, heteronormative, social factions; he views counterpublics as 
“…social movements that are contested by and contest the public sphere for the purposes 
of political efficacy—movements that not only „remap‟ but also produce minoritarian 
space” (148).  
It is important here to reassert the importance of disidentification in creating these 
counterpublics. If counterpublics are real and actualized social movements, then 
disidentification is one of the tools important in constructing them. Disidentifying with 
certain cinematic images gives the audience the tools to imagine new possibilities of 
transformative politics in the form of counterpublics. Through the process of 
disidentification, the spectator is transported to a vantage point where transformation and 
politics are imaginable, where it is possible to dissemble the image and use its parts in 
95 
 
order to create an alternative reality; “Disidentification uses the majoritarian culture as 
raw material to make a new world” (Munoz, 196). 
 Though throughout this project I have discussed disidentification as a process of 
reading films, I hope to have used this conclusion to elaborate on the real world 
possibilities of disidentifying with film. I hope that my project has been clear in showing 
the potential disidentification holds in imaging new futures and building new worlds; 
ones that aren‟t based on exclusion, but inclusion, however utopian that may be. 
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